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PREFACE __________________________ __ 
Limited entry became a serious topic of discussion in the Pacific coast groundfish 
fishery in 1984, a year of economic strife in the trawl fleet which came just after 
a period of rapid expansion. Between 1976 and 1982 annual shoreside landings 
more than doubled, the foreign trawl fishery shrank to insignificance, and the 
"joint venture" fishery was born and prospered. To accomplish this growth in 
landings, the groundfish trawl fleet expanded from fewer than 300 to over 440 
vessels. Economic conditions, however, proved incapable of sustaining the grow-
ing fleet of new, modern trawlers. Neither the Pacific coast rockfish stocks nor 
the traditional flatfISh and sablefish stocks provided the needed room for expan-
sion; nor did the Alaska grounMlSh fIShery absorb the new vessels quickly enough. 
Economic returns to trawl vessel operators, especially those with big mortgage 
loans on new vessels, fell below levels needed to justify the investments. Many 
vessels failed fmancially, and lenders began repossessing vessels from owners with 
delinquent loans. 
During 1982, the Pacific Fishery Management Council was petitioned by a 
group representing trawl fIShermen to adopt an "immediate emergency mora-
torium on all groundflSh trawling". Also, the Council's ground fish management 
team and Scientific and Statistical Committee noted that limiting entry to the 
fishery should be considered as a management tool. In the fall of 1984 the 
Fishermen's Marketing Association in California and the Coast Draggers Associa-
tion in Washington state jointly proposed (see Appendix A) that each of the Pacific 
coast states create a trawl vessel license and place a moratorium on issuing new 
licenses. When draft legislation failed to gain sufficient support in Oregon , the 
moratorium effort lost momentum. Movement toward limiting entry to the 
ground fish fishery ground to a halt when the Pacific Fishery Management Coun-
cil voted not to consider a limited entry system for ground fish during its ground-
fish plan amendment process in 1985. 
In 1986 economic conditions in the trawl fishery improved due to a resurgence 
in the pink shrimp fishery, the reduced number of vessels in the fleet, and the 
lower capital costs faced by purchasers of distress-sale vessels. Although fishery 
management agencies are not now considering a limited access program for 
groundflSh, the Council and the Pacific coast states may be faced with making 
such a decision in the future. Access limitation does afford fishery managers 
several benefits not achievable with traditional fishery regulations. In the first 
chapter of this report, nine objectives of limiting access are listed. Among these 
objectives are economic efficiency, reduced management costs, increased and 
stabilized fIShing fleet profits, equitable distribution of fIShery economic benefits, 
and reduced regulatory burden on the industry. While the reasons for limited 
access focus on social and economic aspects, it may also contribute to fISh stock 
conservation. 
To prepare a thorough examination of alternative approaches to limited access 
for use in future discussions, a Working Group on Limited Access was formed 
in November 1984. The Working Group included economists and fIShery manage-
ment personnel from the National Marine Fisheries Service, Pacific Fishery 
Management Council, and Oregon State University. This report consists mainly 
of papers written by members of the Working Group for presentation to industry 
and fishery management agencies concerned with grounMlSh. The authors of this 
report drew heavily on papers presented at the Workshop on Management Options 
for the North Pacific Long1ine Fisheries sponsored by the Alaska Sea Grant 
Program, held at Eastsound, Washington, April 1986 (Mollett 1986). A shorter 
summary report, consisting mainly of the first two chapters of this report and 
entitled, "A Primer OD Limited Access Alternatives for the Pacific Coast Ground-
fish Fishery", has been printed and distributed by the Pacific Marine Fisheries 
Commission iD Portland. 
The Working Group was assisted by an advisory committee called the Ground-
fISh Alternatives Management group (known as "GAM"), organized by Ed Ueber 
of the Southwest Fisheries CeDter, National Marine Fisheries Service, NOAA. 
Included in GAM were representatives from the three coastal state's fishery 
management ageDcies and several private industry people. GAM reviewed drafts 
of this and provided commeDts and suggestions during three meetings spaced over 
a 14-month period. Members of GAM are not necessarily in agreement with par-
ticular conclusions or views expressed here; nevertheless, their thorough criticism 
of earlier drafts and their frank aDd OpeD expression of viewpoints helped 
immeasurably to improve this report. Also, the "Primer" distributed by PMFC 
was developed in respoDse to ODe of GAM's suggestions. We hope that it proves 
useful to those members of the public who want to become iDvolved in the future 
direction of fisheries management. 
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Introduction: 
Limited Access, 
What is it and why? 
DANIEL D. HUPPERT 
Southwest Fisheries Center 
National Marine Fisheries Service, NOAA 
P.O. Box 271 
La Jolla, CA 92038 
Despite its wide acceptance in other fisheries, limited access remains 
a controversial topic among Pacific coast ground fish fishermen and 
fishery managers. It is controversial because it immediately opens 
a wide array of public policy issues. How should the public con-
serve fish stocks, and who should benefit from harvesting those 
fish? What are the costs and benefits to the public, the taxpayer, 
the fishing industry, and the coastal communities supporting the 
ground fish industry? Should the government push the industry to 
be economically efficient in harvesting; or should it discourage 
technical efficiency to conserve fish stocks? Should management 
preserve the economic status quo by protecting existing harvest 
shares? These are the broad issues occupying the discussions of 
policy makers and academic writers concerned with resource 
management. 
The goal of this introductory section is to define limited access, 
to dispel some basic misunderstandings about limited access, to 
clarify the optional forms of limited access, and to review the various 
resource management objectives addressed. This should set the stage 
for the following more lengthy discussions. By reducing the scope 
of needless misunderstandings, it should also help to make future 
discussions of limited access more productive. 
WHAT IS LIMITED ACCESS? ______ _ 
Limiting access in commercial fisheries is commonly implemented 
through either license limitation programs or assignment of quan-
titative harvest rights. License limitation, most commonly known 
as "limited entry," is the simplest and most widely used form of 
limited access in the United States. A license limitation system issues 
permits to specific individuals (usually fishermen or fishing vessel 
owners) and prohibits landings by those not having a license. As 
will be explained at length in later chapters of this report, licenses 
can be annually renewable or perpetual fishing rights; they may 
be openly tradeable or strictly assigned to a particular person; they 
may be specific to a gear type or species of fish. A wide range of 
conditions and limitations can be placed upon the exercise of the 
fishing rights bestowed through issuance of a license. 
Rather than simply identifying who can fish, quantitative harvest 
rights designate how much each license-holder can take. Like license 
limitation, a quantitative harvest rights system can take on a number 
of different characteristics. A variety of terms have been coined 
for the various quantitative harvest rights schemes. These include 
(I) individual fisherman quotas based upon Francis Christy'S 
original proposal in 1973, (2) individual tradeable quotas as recently 
adopted in New Zealand (Clark and Duncan 1986), (3) quota 
licenses as proposed by Canada's Commission on Pacific Fisheries 
Policy (Pearse 1982), and (4) quota shares or allocated vessel quotas 
(Clark 1980) which represent individual shares of total allowable 
catch. Throughout most of the discussion we will use the term 
"individual fisherman quota" (IFQ), recognizing that individual 
quotas may be alJocated to vessel owners or fishing enterprises rather 
than to fishermen per se. Regardless of what term is used, a quan-
titative harvest rights system controls the totaJ harvest by distributing 
harvest shares among participants in the fishery. 
To some degree all fishery regulations dictate the conditions under 
which fishermen are alJowed access to fish stocks. Traditional forms 
of fishery regulations-including harvest quotas with season 
closures, gear requirements, size limits, and trip limits-restrict 
access to fish stocks. This is an inherent part of defining terms and 
conditions for legal resource use. To control annual harvests, these 
regulations must reduce the level of fishing effort from what it would 
be without regulation. Hence, all fishery conservation regulations, 
both traditional fishery regulations and limited access, conserve fish 
stocks by controlling the level of fishing effort, and this requires 
placing limits on use of the stock. 
What then is the essential difference between a limited access 
system and the traditional approach to fishery regulation? The main 
difference is that traditional regulations seek directly to control 
harvest levels without saying who should be allowed to take a por-
tion of the total allowable harvest; limited access systems begin by 
identifying who is permitted to harvest and. optionally, how much 
they are al.lowed to harvest. Traditional regulations control aggregate 
fishing mortality; limited access establishes limits to individual 
fishing rights. 
Limited access will not necessarily supplant all traditional regula-
tions. License limitation, for example, does not directly control the 
level of harvest by license-holders. Consequently, it may need to 
be supplemented by fishery-wide quotas and technical restrictions 
on vessels and gear. Similarly. even though an individual quota 
system inherently controls total harvest, additional regulations may 
be needed to achieve optimal utilization of the fish stocks. This is 
especially true in multi-species, multi-gear fisheries where it is 
desirable to control size-at-capture, incidental catches, and discards. 
Limited access is commonly practiced without govemment regula-
tion. Common law gives property owners exclusive (but limited) 
rights to use, to prevent others from using, and to sell property. 
There are cases of limited access without legal sanction, such as 
in the famous Maine "lobster fiefs" (Acheson 1975) in which 
fishing rights to local areas were recognized based upon historic 
or cultural tradition. Private rights to land, forests, and other forms 
of property imply limited access and use. The point is that access 
to the resource for harvesting purposes is limited to some identifiable 
set of people. Where legally defmed rights exist. the owners of these 
rights may sell, trade and bequeath the rights to others. Because 
rights can be sold, the identity of resource owners and users may 
change over time. Access to the resource is limited to those who 
possess use rights; but the right to acquire ownership is open to 
all those who wish to obtain use rights by paying the market price 
or complying with state-imposed qualifications. 
All property rights are circumscribed by the law. An owner of 
urban land must comply with zoning laws. An owner of cattle can 
continue to feed the animals or slaughter them for market, but he/she 
must obey law concerning cruel treatment of animals. Ownership 
in a limited access system permits harvest under specific condi-
tions, but does not permit liquidation of the fish stock. The fish 
stock in the ocean remains public property managed by the state 
as a public trust. When licenses and IFQs are marketable, they take 
on many characteristics of property, including a market price. 
Nevertheless, fishing rights are use rights, and these are not the 
same as property rights in the fish stock itself. 
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WHY CONSIDER LIMITED ACCESS? 
WHAT'S DIFFERENT ABOUT FISHING? ___ _ 
Commercial fishing differs from farming, small-scale retailing, and 
other competitive American industries in many respects; the most 
important is the lack of private property rights in an essential 
resource. Unlike farmland and mineral deposits, marine fish popula-
tions cannot be owned by the users. Historically, in western Europe 
and North America, property rights to marine fish stocks did not 
evolve in parallel with rights to land-based resources. Two prin-
cipal reasons for this are apparent. First, it was not until the rapid 
expansion in world fishing after World War II that conservation 
of marine fish stocks was recognized as a serious and widespread 
problem. So long as people believed in the inexhaustibility of marine 
fish, there was no widespread desire to develop institutions for 
limiting access to fisheries. Second, creation and enforcement of 
rights to marine fish are difficult tasks. Fish are not easily observed 
and fenced like a plot of land. To establish, enforce, and exchange 
property rights to fish requires special institutions, legal mech-
anisms, and ways of doing business. 
Today, Pacific coast groundfish stocks are open access or com-
mon property resources. With open access resources, there are no 
restrictions on who can harvest or upon individual harvest levels. 
An open access resource is literally no one's property (not strictly 
property at all). In contrast, a common property resource is owned 
by members of a group or community. Owners have equal use 
rights. From the standpoint of licensed commercial fishermen, a 
license limitation system converts a free access resource into a com-
mon property resource. Although the licensed fishermen are not 
legal owners, they become a closed group of resource users, like 
the animal grazers using a common pasture. With either open access 
or common property, competitive free enterprise among resource 
users cannot be expected to assure adequate resource conservation. 
Additional restrictions on harvests are needed. This need has long 
been recognized, and it is the reason for public fisheries manage-
ment. 
Harvesters of an open access or common property resource often 
fail to take appropriate conservation action. It may not be readily 
apparent to an individual that his use affects the resource size and, 
ultimately, the profits of all resource users. When there are a myriad 
of others fishing, a single fisherman will have difficulty even detect-
ing the effect that his own catch has on the overall abundance of 
fish. Even when fishermen are aware that they affect the size of 
fish populations, they may take no conservation measures unless 
they are assured that other users will act in concert to achieve the 
future benefits of conservation. New entrants may dilute the benefits 
of conservation when economic returns show improvement. 
Thus individual actions, based upon self-interest, cannot assure 
adequate conservation and cannot effectively promote long-term 
economic returns from common property or open-access natural 
resources. Collectively, however, resource users can gain through 
appropriate restrictions on use. This is true of groundwater basins 
and public grazing lands as well as fish stocks. Restrictions on 
individual resource use can be effected through cooperative 
agreements among users, through certain regional resource agencies 
like water districts, or even through Federal regulations. In all cases, 
optimum management requires that individual incentives for short-
term economic gain be brought into line with sustainable levels of 
use. 
Regulation of water and grazing lands normally involves quan-
titative limits to individual use. In medieval England many villages 
had commons which were regulated through "stinting," a term for 
limiting the number of animals grazed by individual peasants. These 
rules for common property use continue in modified form to modern 
times. Similarly, sheep and cattle ranchers using public grazing lands 
in the western United States are allocated so many "animal unit 
months" (AUMs) which roughly corresponds to a known quantity 
of forage harvested. Farmers irrigating fields in central California 
each have a quantity of water to which they are entitled. This en-
titlement may be attached to the land as a water right. These water 
and grazing rights are forms of limited access in that they designate 
both (1) which individuals have use rights and (2) the amount of 
use allowed. 
These forms of limited access are not intended to prevent people 
from becoming farmers or cattlemen. There is no list of licensed 
or "qualified" farmers. If you want to try your hand at raising 
almonds in Kern county, California, you can buy or rent land and 
obtain the necessary water rights. There is free entry to the industry. 
Fishing, farming, and retailing are similar in this important respect. 
To exercise this right of free entry, a business firm must acquire 
the necessary implements and materials. In farming or ranching 
one requirement is a source of water or rangeland forage. In an 
open access fishery, however, a new entrant cannot acquire rights 
to a given quantity of fish. A newcomer simply dips into the com-
mon pool, often taking a portion of the available harvest away from 
established fishermen. 
Rather than establish a limited number of quantitative use rights, 
groundfish managers have established aggregate harvest quotas (or 
guidelines) and have instituted other restrictive rules on fishing enter-
prises in order to achieve economic and social objectives. Individual 
fishing firms then compete for fish based upon harvesting capacity 
and skill. When quotas are inappropriate, managers may prefer to 
restrict effectiveness of the gear (such as maximum allowable length 
of gill nets) or the portion of the stock that is vulnerable to harvest 
(mesh size regulations, for example). Pacific coast groundfish 
regulations incorporate many of these methods. While these harvest 
regulations may adequately prevent fish stock depletion, they do 
not address a number of other problems. 
Economic and social problems frequently occur in quota-regulated 
open access fisheries. Some of these problems are: 
(1) Economic profits are lost to increased fishing costs. Because 
individual fishermen can maintain or expand their individual harvest 
shares only by catching fish at a faster rate, they tend to compete 
by increasing fishing capacity. This is costly for the individual vessel 
owner, but may result in increased earnings for the vessel. When 
the fish stocks are under quotas, increased fishing capacity results 
in no increased fish catch but does raise the total cost of taking the 
quota. 
(2) Overcrowding and gear conflicts occur. Fishermen concen-
trate in the best fishing areas and during the best fishing seasons. 
In some cases this results in a very short and furious fishing season 
which may pressure individual fishermen to operate under unsafe 
conditions. This can cause loss of gear and can increase the cost 
and risk in operating a fishing vessel. 
(3) Economic instability due to changing profits and harvest 
regulations. Excessive numbers of new entrants are often attracted 
to fisheries during periods of higher-than-normal profits. Many of 
these new firms will go bankrupt under normal circumstances, 
leaving the fishing fleet overbuilt and with many small firms in finan-
cial trouble. While cyclical instability affects many industries, its 
impacts are amplified in quota-regulated commercial fisheries. This 
instability is often further amplified by changing harvest regula-
tions. When new vessels swarm into a fishery during good years, 
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managers will tighten the harvest regulations in response. Unstable 
regulations make it more difficult for established fishing vessel 
owners to plan for the longer term. 
(4) With large amounts of redundant harvesting capacity, 
regulatory burdens and management costs become excessive. To 
assure adequate fish stock conservation, there must be restrictive 
fishing regulations. Annual quotas may be augmented by trip limits 
and other restrictions. To implement regulations there must be many 
committees, hearings, and enforcement agents. The resulting 
regulatory bureaucracy is costly. 
Limited access to commercial fisheries is in part a response to 
these social and economic issues, but it may be used also as a 
resource conservation tool in heavily exploited fisheries. Some 
Australian license limitation programs, for example, were adopted 
early enough in the developing fishery to prevent extensive over-
expansion of fishing capacity. This provides a substantial measure 
of protection to the fish stocks. A similar degree of conservation 
could be achieved in heavily exploited fisheries by license limita-
tion followed by fleet reduction, or by IFQs. 
OTHER UNCONVENTIONAL APPROACHES 
TO RESOURCE CONSERVATION _____ _ 
It should be noted that license limitation and IFQs are not the only 
alternative approaches to common property resource management 
currently under serious discussion. A radically different approach 
would be to levy taxes or royalties on fish landings. This sort of 
approach has been given serious consideration in designing pro-
grams to reduce air and water pollution (e.g., the so-called "pollu-
tion taxes"), and public interest groups have pushed proposals to 
increase charges for irrigation water and for use of public grazing 
lands where those resources appear to be overused or misused. The 
basic logic of a tax charge is that it changes economic incentives 
in the correct direction. 
Firms using common property resources and firms relying on 
publicly subsidized resource development projects, do not bear, nor 
do they adequately take into consideration, the full cost of resource 
use. This is related to lack of private property rights. The fishing 
firm does not have a direct financial interest in the economic value 
of the fish stock; its only interest is in the portion of the stock that 
it can capture and sell. Consequently, the cost of reducing the fish 
stock (i.e., reduced catch rates for all firms and reduced future 
availability of fish) is not felt directly by the firm and it does not 
consider that cost in deciding how much to harvest. A rancher, on 
the other hand, must account for the effects of a reduced herd on 
the book value of his livestock. Similarly, a hypothetical private 
fish stock owner would bear the cost of a deterioration in his fish 
stock. The prospect of reduced asset values associated with over-
fishing would act as a strong incentive to harvest at an economically 
efficient level. Since firms fishing on a common property stock do 
not experience the reduced asset value, they do not have the proper 
incentives to conserve. One solution is for a public agency to com-
pute what that asset deterioration cost should be and establish a 
royalty fee equal to that cost. After that, the private firms will have 
the proper disincentives to overfish. 
This proposal has been described in textbooks and academic 
papers, but has never been applied to a fishery. Some reasons for 
this are apparent. First, fishery managers are most frequently trained 
in scientific disciplines that do not explore taxation as a means of 
regulating behavior. Thus the royalty scheme is generally proposed 
by an "outsider" and is given less serious consideration than other 
direct forms of regulation. Second. the political machinery is strong-
ly geared to protecting the rights and financial interests of current 
resource users. Since the harvest royalty would, at least superficially 
and in the short run, reduce the income in fishing, it would work 
to the disadvantage of exactly those resource users who are most 
clearly represented in the political process. Even though various 
provisions could be developed to reduce the short-run burden on 
fishermen and to assure that revenues raised by the royalty were 
used for resource protection and enhancement, this political aspect 
raises strong objections to using royalties as a resource manage-
ment tool. 
Other practical reasons for not using landings taxes to manage 
fish stocks are (I) the computational task is extremely formidable, 
and (2) the necessary flexibility in tax rate may be difficult to at-
tain in a legislative system. Because the royalty or tax should equal 
the cost associated with reduced asset value of the fish stock, the 
tax would have to be adjusted as fish prices, fishing costs, and fish 
stock abundances change. Given the imprecision in fish stock 
assessments and the frequency of changes in prices. it is unlikely 
that the tax rates could be accurately computed and adjusted. 
Whether the imprecision in tax rates would create more difficulties 
than, say, imprecision in harvest quotas is a topic for future research 
and discussion. 
Also, authority to set tax and royalty rates is not now delegated 
to state fish and game agencies or to the Pacific Fishery Manage-
ment Council. Thus the legislatures would have to change tax rates 
in a timely and appropriate fashion, or they would have to delegate 
such power to managing agencies or commissions. It might be 
possible to develop legislation that would allow agencies to vary 
royalty rates based upon economic and biological criteria. Because 
this sort of system has had little political support, it has not been 
thoroughly examined. Further work may reveal promising 
alternatives for tax or royalty management, but this will require 
longer term research and development than license and IFQ 
options. 
OBJECTIVES OF LIMITED ACCESS ____ _ 
Limiting access to commercial fisheries can address a great number 
of different objectives. Some of the more prominent objectives are 
as follows: 
1. Promote economic efficiency in harvesting. 
2. Establish stable and secure tenure to the fishery for licensed 
fishermen. 
3. Enhance the value of fishery products delivered to consumers. 
4. Increase and stabilize the profitability of the fishing fleet. 
5. Reduce the burden of management regulations on the industry. 
6. Reduce the cost of fisheries management born by the public. 
7. Secure an equitable distribution of benefits from the fishery. 
8. Protect various segments of the fishing industry from other 
fishermen and non-commercial interests. 
9. Help restrain fishing effort and conserve fish stocks. 
This list does not include every conceivable objective, but it does 
illustrate the broad range of considerations that can be addressed. 
A brief explanation of these objectives will help to focus the 
discussion. 
Economic efficiency in harvesting involves delivering the avail-
able raw fish to dockside with the least possible cost expended on 
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fishing. and delivering the fish in appropriate condition and on a 
time schedule suitable for marketing. Because open access fisheries 
normally exhibit substantial excess fishing capacity, which is con-
trolled by quotas and other economically inefficient regulations, 
substantial advances may be made toward this goal through limited 
access. To actually calculate an efficient harvest program is a dif-
ficult task that is rarely attempted. It was recently estimated that 
an efficiently operated Pacific coast groundfish fishery could 
generate between $7 million and $17 million annually in net 
economic benefits. This could be accomplished with a fishing fleet 
approximately 40% smaller than the fleet operated in 1984. Where 
the total falls in this range depends mainly on the size of the Pacific 
whiting fishery. (See Chapter 5 for details.) A new limited access 
system may not be able to achieve the estimated level of economic 
gains, at least not without a moderately long adjustment period, 
but the potential gains are sufficient to make increased economic 
efficiency an important objective. 
Secure tenure in the fishery has at least two dimensions. It means 
that a fisherman does not have to perform up to a particular state-
imposed standard in order to continue in the fishery, and it means 
that a fisherman is assured of future benefits from sacrifices made 
to conserve fish stocks. In open access fisheries, and in some license 
limited fisheries, a fisherman cannot reduce his fishing or stop 
fishing temporarily in hopes of harvesting larger or more numerous 
fish later. With secure, individual fishing rights, however, a fisher-
man can afford to fish more slowly and to wait until fish are of 
optimal size or in optimum condition. 
The quality of fish delivered to market may be improved under 
a limited access system. Fishermen and processors operating under 
open access are sometimes forced to compete for fish by harvesting 
in a hurry. This may result in increased occurrence of spoiled or 
unnecessarily frozen fish products. This is especially a problem 
when traditional quota management results in short fishing seasons 
that overwhelm the processing and distribution sectors. If fishermen 
are given individual quotas, they are free to stretch out the fishing 
over a longer period of time. Recent Pacific halibut experience pro-
vides the classic example of open-access fishing causing so short 
and furious a fishing season that costs of processing and storing 
the high-valued product are higher than necessary, and almost all 
the fish have to be frozen. 
Profits are usually highest when fishing fleets begin exploiting 
a new fish stock or have a particularly large year-class of tradi-
tional fish stocks. The usual tendency, however, is for profits to 
fall as add itional vessels are attracted. If the fleet size grows as 
the fish stock is depleted, then a period of serious economic disloca-
tion may ensue. Recent ex.perience with rockfish stocks off the 
Pacific coast provides a case study in this process. A properly 
managed limited access system would be able to prevent the in-
stability in profits by attenuating the growth and decline in the fishing 
fleet. Higher fleet profits can be earned when the numbers of fishing 
vessels are just sufficient to harvest the available yield. Sustained 
high profits require stability in market prices, costs, and fish stocks. 
Limited access cannot provide stability in all these, but it does 
remove one common source of economic instability and should result 
in higher average annual profits. 
Reducing the burden of fishing regulations on the industry is an 
appropriate goal, but it is unclear what particular change in regula-
tions constitutes a reduced burden. Regulations on gear quantity 
or design, commercial fishing seasons, and "trip limits" may be 
viewed as a burden. From an economics perspective, all these forms 
of regulation cause private fishing operators to incur additional costs. 
By establishing a reduced and more efficient fishing fleet, limited 
access may pennit some of the regulations to be removed. Whether 
such a change would result in an overall reduction in burden of 
regulations is largely a matter of definition and perception. 
Reducing the public expenditures on management would relieve 
the taxpayer·s burden of fishery regulations. The current ground-
fish management system uses public resources to perform necessary 
biological research and fish stock assessments, to monitor fish land-
ings, to support Coast Guard and State marine enforcement opera-
tions, to carry out legal sanctions against violators of regulations, 
and to make public decisions on management plans. A recent rough 
estimate of costs associated with Pacific coast groundfish indicates 
that about $5.5 million is spent on resource assessment, and $5.6 
million on management, enforcement, coordination, and com-
munications. (See Chapter 6 for details.) Costs of managing a fishery 
will, of course, depend partly upon the character of the fishery and 
partly upon the types of regulations promulgated. If limited access 
is conducive to lower management costs, this should be an impor-
tant consideration. 
Everyone agrees that fishing regulations should entail an 
"equitable" distribution of benefits. Although there is no widely 
recognized definition of equity, there are clear patterns in manage-
ment practice. In a recent study of twelve government programs 
that allocate property rights, Rolph (1983) found that policymakers 
deal with the equity issue by designing regulations to minimize any 
redistribution of wealth. Where established resource users enjoy 
benefits of a communal resource (such as in land development, air 
pollution, groundwater pumping) "the judicial, the legislative, and 
the executive branches have uniformly supported the claims of 
historic users when allocating rights. " This principle seems to be 
honored as well by the existing fishery limited-access system. A 
reasonable way of dealing with the equity question, therefore, may 
be to assure that no established fishermen suffer a measurable loss 
due to the access regulations. As a first approximation this can be 
accomplished by retaining historic allocations of catch among 
existing gear types, vessel size classes, and geographic subdivisions. 
Where rapid changes have been occurring in the fishery, it is not 
clear that historic shares preserve the economic status quo. New 
entrants and previous operators with new vessels may pose a pro-
blem, for example. Nevertheless, initial preservation of historic 
catch shares under a limited access system provides a simple and 
operational means of dealing with the equity effect of the new 
system. 
To protect various segments of the fishery from one another may 
be more than just another form of the equity issue. Where recrea-
tional or environmental interests collide with commercial fishing 
interests, a limit to commercial fleet size may help to quell strong 
political and economic forces that could eliminate the fishery en-
tirely. California has adopted license limitation programs in the drift 
gill net swordfish and shark fishery and in the northern California 
set gill and tranunel net fishery in order to deal with politically potent 
rivalries between user groups. Limited access has proved to be a 
useful tool for staking out territories and limiting the range of 
conflict. 
Finally, limited entry can assist in conserving fish stocks. In the 
case of license limitation, the control over fishing effort may be 
too weak and ineffectual to assure fish stock conservation. On the 
other hand, an individual quota system provides direct controls over 
total harvests and may be a useful substitute for other forms of ef-
fort regulation. 
No single system of regulation could address all nine of these 
objectives simultaneously and with equal success. A limited access 
system must be tailored to the specific objectives sought. And it 
5 
must address the various private and public interests reflected in 
the objectives discussed here. 
CONCLUSIONS ____________________ __ 
Several conclusions from the preceding discussion are worth 
repeating and summarizing. First, a limited access system is 
basically a social mechanism for reducing the excessive competi-
tion for fish that occurs when fish stocks are open to all comers. 
It is an alternative or a complement to traditional quota, season, 
and gear regulations. Among the alternative regulatory systems, 
it is uniquely able to address economic efficiency of the commer-
cial fishing industry. In fisheries that are already highly regulated 
like Pacific groundfish, limited entry should be viewed as one com-
ponent of a multidimensional management strategy. The choice is 
not between limiting access to the fishery or having a free and open 
commercial fishery. Rather it is between one set of regulations on 
competitive fishing and another set. 
Second, there are several varieties of limited access. The two 
alternatives receiving the most attention are license limitation and 
IFQs. With either major type of limited access there are numerous 
variations in detailed application. Much public discussion and par-
ticipation should be devoted to determining exactly what features 
to include in a limited access program for any particular fishery. 
The ultimate allocation of benefits from the fishery would depend 
upon the detailed decisions made in designing an actual limited ac-
cess program. 
Third, the problems of economic competition for common 
property or open access resources are not unique to fisheries; adop-
tion of limited access rules are implicit in many other economic 
systems, including that of private property resource ownership. 
Rules for use of rangeland, groundwater supplies, and the air have 
similar features to fishery regulations. While the elusive marine 
fish populations are not susceptible to subdivision into pieces of 
private property, the limited access approach attempts to generate 
some of the conservation and economic benefits that flow from a 
free enterprise, private property system. 
Finally, it is clear that selection of management method deter-
mines what fishing rights or privileges, with corresponding 
economic benefits, are enjoyed by commercial users of the fishery 
resource. When a season closure or a license limitation is adopted 
by the fishery management authorities, the fisherman's economic 
gain from fishing is altered. Thus the nature of fishing rights or 
privileges is subject to change at the discretion of fishery councils. 
Commercial fishing rights are not "inalienable rights" like the right 
to free speech. They are even less secure from political meddling 
than standard property rights applying to one's personal posses-
sions. To the extent that a limited access system does establish 
broader and more secure fishing rights, it will place the fisherman 
in a position much closer to that of a property owner. But the key 
decisions will remain those of the public managers whose trust 
responsibility is established by the various state and federal laws. 
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The ground fish fishery off California, Oregon, and Washington is 
a highly diverse fishery . Several different commercial vessel and 
gear types harvest a large number of species in all sections of the 
coast. Recreational hook-and-Iine fishing is important as well, 
especially in central and southern California . Figure 1 illustrates 
the International North Pacific Fishery Commission (INPFC) areas 
for which commercial fishing data and management regulations are 
reported. 
Species classified as "groundfish" include flatfishes (e.g., Dover, 
English, petrale, rock, and rex sole) , round fishes (e .g., sablefish, 
Pacific cod. ling cod, and Pacific whiting), a large number of the 
Sebastes species (yellowtail, canary, widow, boccacio, chilipepper, 
and shortbelly rockfish), and thorny heads (Sebastolobus). The 
Pacific Coast Groundfish Fishery Management Plan also includes 
certain sharks, skates, ratfish, rattails, jack mackerel, and other 
fish that are of minor importance to the fishery . 
Commercial groundfish fishing is divided into three distinct 
segments: shoreside domestic landings, "joint venture" harvest, 
and foreign catch. The quantity and exvessel value of shoreside land-
ings (Table 1) grew from about 60 thousand metric tons (mt) and 
$20 million in 1976, to 120 thousand mt and $60 million in 1982. 
As the rockfish harvest declined, however, the totals fell to about 
90 thousand mt and $49 million in 1984, although the exvessel value 
recovered to $57 million in 1985 . As shown in Table 2, most of 
the commercial stocks of ground fish have been harvested at or near 
the maximum 8ustainable levels estimated by the Groundfish 
Management Team. Unless the domestic fishery expands its harvest 
of less utilized fish stocks (such as shortbelly rockfish and Pacific 
whiting), the total harvest is unlikely to grow by more than a few 
thousand tons . 
Since 1978, " joint venture" agreements between domestic trawl 
fishermen and foreign floating processors have become an impor-
tant factor in the harvest of Pacific Whiting . This provides a major 
source of income for many of the new, midwater trawl vessels . 
Annual harvests in joint venture fishing grew to 79 thousand mt 
in 1984, but fell back to 31 thousand mt in 1985 . Since this is still 
far below the estimated sustainable yield of 175,000 mt, expan-
sion of both joint venture and shoreside landings is possible. 
Foreign harvests declined substantially after 1976. With the ex-
pulsion of Soviet and Polish trawlers after Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, foreign harvest stopped entirely. In 1985 Polish vessels 
were again permitted to harvest Pacific whiting . Foreign harvest 
of underutilized species can continue under Governing International 
Fishery Agreements negotiated with the State Department until the 
U.S. fishing industry demonstrates a capacity and intent to take the 
entire available biological yield. 
Tables 3a and 3b show the breakdown of harvests of the most 
important species groups in 1985 by geographic areas and gear 
types. Rockfish seem to concentrate mainly in the Columbia area 
and the Monterey area, while sablefish catch is more evenly 
distributed along the coast. The Columbia area is most important 
and the Conception area is least significant for all main species 
groups . The huge volumes of Pacific whiting caught in Vancouver 
and Columbia areas are due to the joint venture fishery . From Table 
3b it is clear that trawl fishing dominates to an overwhelming degree 
the commercial harvest of groundfish . Fixed gear (pots and traps, 
gill nets, and hook-and-line) took a substantial portion of the 
sablefish in 1985 and a moderate amount of rockfish and other 
groundfish. The division of catch among the gear types will ex-
hibit some variation over the years, but trawl gear always dominates. 
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Table I-Pacific coast ground fish harvest quantity and exvessel values. 
n.d. = no data. 
Domestic harvests 
Shoreside Joint venture Foreign' 
Year 1.000 mt $mil. 1,000 mt $mil. 1,000 mt $mil. 
1976 57.0 19.4 255.0 n.d. 
1977 59.8 20.7 118.0 n.d. 
1978 71.6 34.5 0.9 0.1 980 13.3 
1979 90.0 47.9 8.8 1.2 117.0 15.9 
1980 87.9 37.1 26.8 3.3 44.6 5.5 
1981 103.9 46.8 43.8 6.3 70.9 10.2 
1982 119.0 60.0 67.7 10.4 7.3 1.1 
1983 97.7 52.2 72.1 10.2 
1984 89.6 49.1 79.0 11.8 14.8 2.2 
1985 89.8 57.0 31.6 3.8 50.2 6.1 
'Foreign fishery value calculated on assumption that price is equal to joint 
venture average price per metric ton. 
Sources: Pacific Fishery Management Council (1982, 1986). 
Table 2-Pacific coast ground fish harvests, estimated maximum sustainable 
yields (MSy), and allowable biological catch (ABC). n.d. = no data; 
• = MSY estimated to be at least as large as ABC. 
Annual harvest 
ABC 
Species 1976 1982 1985 MSY 1986 
Arrowtooth flounder n.d. n.d. 2,568 
Dover sole 13,179 20,916 20,525 24,398 27,900 
English sole 4,488 2,771 1,871 4,500 1,500 
Petrale sole 2,816 2,619 1,826 3,200 3,200 
Other flatfish 4,690 11,691 3,455 7,700 
Boecacio n.d. n.d. 1,250 6,100 6,100 
Canary rockfish n.d. 4,296 2,046 3,500 3,500 
Chili pepper n.d. n.d. 1,001 2,300 2,300 
Yellowtail rockfish n.d. 8,715 3,058 3,416 4,855 
Pacific Ocean perch 2,336 893 1,375 5,300 1,550 
Shonbelly rockfish 3 12 44,200 10,000 
Widow rockfish 25.445 9,026 9,200 9,300 
Remaining rockfish n.d. n.d. 15,225 13,700 
Thornyheads n.d. n.d. 4,067 4,400 4,400 
Ling cod 2,542 3.809 3,809 7.000 7,000 
Pacific cod 2.165 910 377 3,100 
Pacifie whiting 
Shoreside trace 1,023 3,895 
"Joint Venture" 0 67,465 31,512 175,500 300,000 
Foreign catch 231,000 7,089 50,563 
Sablefish 7,028 18,592 14,580 7,200 10,000 
Other round fish 5,187 4,918 5,723 14,700 
Totals 295,482 193,550 170,146 339,414 430,805 
Sources: 1976 harvests from Pac. Fish. Manage. Counc. (1982), Table 8. 
1982 and 1985 harvests from PACFIN Rep. 001. 
MSY estimates and ABCs from Pac. Fish. Manage. Coune. (1985). 
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Table 3a-1985 Pacific coast commercial domestic harvests (mt) by INPFC 
area and species group. 
Species 
group Vancouver Columbia Eureka Monterey Conception Total 
Rocklish :1,406 14,684 6.024 9.751 2,892 36.800 
Sablelish ),745 5.307 2,480 3.214 269 14,016 
Pacific whiting 14 885 2,996 3.895 
Other round fish 2.253 2.340 ( 6.902 11,495 
Flatfish 4.306 9,262 7.203 7.619 1,847 30.237 
Others 123 45 97 113 101 479 
Total 14,819 30,424 51.679 96.922 
---- - --- - .- - - ---
S0urce: PACFIN Rep. 00 I. Includes joint venture catch. 
Table 3b-1985 Pacific coast commercial groundfish harvests (mt) by gear 
type and species group. 
Species Groundfish Pots and Shrimp Gill Hook-and 
group trawls traps trawl nets line Other 
Rockfish 29,692 56 372 2.996 1.764 1.915 
Sablefish 7,194 3,574 34 231 2.665 343 
Pacific whit~ng 3,886 7 1 
Other round fish 14.300 4 416 208 418 
Flatfish 30,016 54 54 57 57 
Others 289 1 116 39 34 
Total 85,377 3,635 468 3.814 4.733 2.768 
Source: PAC FIN Rep. 009. 
Coinciding with the growth in ground fish harvest was an expan-
sion in commercial fishing fleet size (see Table 4). The greatest 
increase in fishing capacity is due to additional trawl fishing vessels. 
The number of active Pacific coast trawlers grew from about 270 
in 1976 to 444 in 1982. Recent financial difficulties (which coin-
cided with decreased rockfish harvests and some lower ground fish 
exvessel prices) have caused the trawl fleet to shrink by about 87 
vessels. During the same period of nine years, the number of vessels 
fishing with fish pots or traps grew from 36 to 207 and then fell 
back to 34. This pattern of growth and decline was widely attributed 
to the changing Japanese demand for sablefish, the major target 
species for fish pots. 
Longline (or setline) fishing vessels target mainly on sable fish 
and rockfish, although they take sigruficant amounts of ling cod 
as well. Some Pacific halibut is taken by longline off the Pacific 
coast, but in comparison with the Gulf of Alaska fishery this is a 
relatively insigruficant fishery. The number of hook-and-line fishing 
vessels has remained in the neighborhood of 200 in recent years. 
Set net fishing (including gill nets and trammel nets) for ground-
fish species has expanded in two areas. In central and southern 
Califorrua (i.e., the Monterey and Conception statistical areas) there 
were nearly 900 licensed gilJ net fishermen in 1984. GilJ net harvest 
grew from about 1,460 mt in 1981 to 3,814 mt in 1985. California 
ground fish set gill and trammel nets catch mainly rockfish, ling 
cod, California halibut, and croakers. The number of commercial 
set net fishermen is limited by a State license limitation program. 
The second area of gill net expansion is the Washington coast, where 
the success of one experimental gill net fisherman in 1980 has led 
to the entry of a dozen additional commercial set net operators. 
Operating at depths ranging down to 200 fathoms in canyons, the 
Table 4-GroundflSh fleet size, 1976-84. 
No. vessels with specified gear 
Year Oner trawl l Pot/trap2 Longline2 
1976 269 36 N/A 
1977 286 60 N/A 
1978 351 119 N/A 
1979 472 207 299 
1980 458 116 205 
1981 408 66 191 
1982 444 82 208 
1983 436 61 184 
1984 398 34 396 
1985 357 32 3129 
Source: Korson and Silverthorne (1985). 
IYessel numbers before 1981 include double-counting of 
vessels fishing in more than one stale. 
2Yessels landing fish wilh Ihese gear Iypes in two or more 
states are counted more than once. 
3These numbers represent only Oregon and Washington 
wilh double-counting eliminated. California data not available 
at time of publication. 
set nets catch primarily sablefish, "slope" rockfish, arrowtooth 
flounder, and spiny dogfish. 
Pacific coast ground fish fishermen often take nongroundfish 
species as well. In 1981, for example, 152 of the 340 coastwide 
shrimp trawlers switched to ground fish trawl gear for at least part 
of the year. Due to poor shrimp yields in 1982 through 1984, nearly 
all of the pink shrimp trawlers converted to groundfish trawling. 
This is one source of new entrants to the groundfish trawl fleet. 
Ability to shift among target fisheries is also exhibited by smaller 
inshore trawlers of the Crescent City area which fish for Dungeness 
crab in the winter and trawl for sole and rockfish during the fall 
and spring. 
Groundfish vessels display a significant amount of geographic 
mobility as well. It is not uncommon for midwater trawl vessels 
to fish in joint venture operations off the West coast or in Alaska 
during the spring and summer, but to fish rockfish for shoreside 
processors during the winter. Nearshore, flatfish trawlers are known 
to make seasonal shifts between ports as distant as Crescent City 
and Morro Bay, California. Similarly, large ground fish processors 
are not reluctant to purchase raw fish from geographically dispersed 
sources. A Eureka area processor, for example, may buy fish in 
Coos Bay and San Francisco when it is convenient to do so. 
Both economic reasoning (see Huppert 1979) and statements by 
industry members suggest that the degree of flexibility reflected 
in the geographic, gear, and species switching in the commercial 
fleet is an important aspect of business strategy. When market prices 
and species availability exhibit unanticipated fluctuations, commer-
cial operators with experience and expertise in several different 
fisheries have an advantage. They can respond by shifting among 
fishing activities which will reduce their business risk by "diver-
sification," in much the same way that investors diversify among 
stocks, bonds, and other assets. Many trawl fishermen consider it 
essential that management regulations allow them to move between 
joint venture fisheries (either Pacific coast or Alaska) and shoreside 
domestic fishing, between bottom trawling and midwater trawling, 
and between shrimp and bottom trawling. This multipurpose 
capability must be recognized in designing a limited access system. 
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Table 5-Catch and revenue share distributions among 
401 active groundflSh trawl vessels, 1983 and 1984. 
% of ground fish 
catch % of revenue 
Top % 
of vessels 1983 1984 1983 1984 
10 35.6 32.9 32.6 30.4 
20 57.0 53.7 53.3 50.8 
30 71.6 69.1 67.6 65.7 
40 82.0 80.8 78.5 77.4 
50 89.1 88.5 86.4 85.8 
60 93.9 93.8 92.1 92.0 
70 96.9 97.0 95.9 95.9 
80 98.9 98.9 98.5 98.4 
90 99.8 99.8 99.7 99.7 
Source: Annual summary records for vessels using bottom, 
ground fish, or midwater trawl gear. Includes domestic land-
ings and exvessel revenue from all species landed by trawl 
vesseLs. 
Table 6-Technical changes affecting fIShing power and 
safety characteristics of Pacific coast trawlers. 
% adopting 
Technical 
innovation Before 1980 1980-84 Total 
Midwater trawling 3.7 18.1 21.7 
Chromoscope 1.2 43.4 44.6 
Sonar 21.7 19.3 41.0 
Track ploner 13.3 48.1 61.4 
Radio facsimile 3.6 7.2 10.8 
Survival suit 48.2 32.5 80.7 
EPIRB 8.4 16.9 25.3 
Personal computer 4.8 6.0 10.8 
Source: Dewees (1985). 
Another fleet characteristic important to the operation of a limited 
entry system, the concentration of harvests among a small propor-
tion of vessels, is displayed in Table 5. To construct this table we 
ranked domestic trawl vessels in order of annual tonnage landed 
and ex vessel value of shoreside landings in 1981 and 1982 (not in-
cluding joint venture catch). The top 10% of the fleet caught 43 % 
of total fleet landings in 1981 and 44% in 1982. Ninety percent 
of the total catch was taken by only 50 % of the nominal trawl fleet. 
Exvessel value of landings is not quite so concentrated in the up-
per end of the fleet, indicating that higher volume of landings is 
associated with lower value per ton landed. We expect that con-
centration of volume and value of landings would be about the same 
in recent years. 
The technical capabilities of commercial fishing vessels are being 
steadily improved. Dewees (1985) has recently studied the rate of 
adoption of technological innovations by the trawl fleet. Table 6 
summarizes some of Dewees' findings based upon interviews with 
83 trawl vessel operators during 1984. Of the eight technical in-
novations examined, the four that seem to contribute most directly 
to fishing power are midwater trawling, chromoscope, sonar, and 
track plotter. The radio facsimile, survival suit, emergency posi-
tion indicator radio beacon (EPIRB), and personal computer are 
Table 7-Length distribution (ft) of trawl vessels in 1984, and disposition of 
100 vessels missing from the active neet in 1984. 
<30 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 80-89 >90 
1984 neet 2 20 100 108 105 44 II 
Known losses I 25 27 26 II 3 2 
Sunk 0 I 8 12 10 6 2 
Alaska and other 0 0 0 3 5 4 
Repossessed 0 4 5 2 I 
Inactive 0 I 2 4 0 0 0 
Other 0 0 2 4 4 0 0 
Note: A total of20ltrawlers that landed groundfish on the Pacific coast during 
1981-83 did not land fish during 1984. Of these we have information on the disposi-
tion of 103. For three of these we do not know the vessel length, and they are 
not reported in the table. 
more closely related to safety and convenience. While the specific 
contribution of any of these innovations to fish harvest capability 
or safety would be difficult to quantify, the fact that new equip-
ment is rapidly adopted by a significant portion of the fishing fleet 
indicates that fishing capacity is changing and expanding in many 
dimensions. This suggests that it would be a mistake to rely heavily 
upon the number and size of vessels as a simple measure of fleet 
capacity. 
Due to both the changing technology and the wide variation in 
landings among vessels, one cannot assume the fleet's harvest will 
be proportional to number of active vessels. Consequently, a license 
limitation program coupled with attrition or voluntary "buy-back" 
of licenses may have surprisingly little effect on fleet capacity. Even 
if "high-liners" are targeted in the fleet reduction, it is possible 
for licensed vessels that were previously low producers to become 
high-liners. 
During 1983 and 1984 the trawl fleet was beset by falling rockfish 
quotas, falling sablefish and Dover sole prices, and a backlog of 
high interest-rate loans. One result was an unusual number of losses 
from the fleet due to bankruptcy, bank repossessions, sinkings, and 
transfers to other fisheries. Of the 599 trawlers known to have made 
commercial sales of groundfish during 1981-84, a total of201 were 
no longer in the Pacific coast fishery in 1985. We were unable to 
ascertain the fate of all 20 I vessels, but information on 100 vessels 
has been summarized in Table 7. This shows that losses from the 
fleet occurred among almost all sizes of vessels and that there was 
no disproportionate loss from large or small size categories. Forty-
five percent ofthe known losses were due to sinkings or burnings, 
21 % percent were repossessed and inactive, 20 % of the vessels 
were fishing in Alaska, 8 % were fishing in other fisheries, and 6% 
were still afloat but not fishing. 
The financial hardships reflected in these losses from the trawl 
fleet had a variety of causes, and have elicited a variety of sug-
gested solutions, including a return to use of mesh size restrictions 
rather than species quotas; elimination of trips limits on rockfish; 
greater involvement of industry representatives in management deci-
sions; grouping of species quotas to reflect catch groupings; leaving 
regulations unchanged for longer periods of time; prohibition of 
discards; prohibition of gill nets; better stock assessments by 
biologists; creation of a separate California regional fishery manage-
ment council; reduced dependence of management on fishery data 
(i.e., fish tickets and logbook records); and placement of a mora-
torium on trawl vessel licenses. All of these suggestions (and many 
others not listed here) have been delivered in person or in writing 
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to the Pacific Fishery Management Council and its subgroups. Many 
deserve serious attention by the management agencies. However, 
financial and management problems prompting the trawl license 
moratorium proposal and some of the other more controversial pro-
posals seem to have declined since 1984. This may provide a needed 
respite for careful and thorough consideration of a range of new 
management alternatives, including license limitation systems and 
individual fishermen quotas. 
CONCLUSIONS ___________ _ 
Based on this short review of the ground fish fishery, several im-
portant implications for discussion of limited access are evident. 
First, both the total levels of harvest and the trawl fleet size seem 
to have peaked in 1982. Future growth of the fishery will depend 
upon increased exploitation of less valued stocks such as Pacific 
whiting and shortbelly rockfish. There seems to be more than suf-
ficient fishing capacity for the traditional species. Second, 
geographical and biological diversity of the fishery resources results 
in a wide variety of fishing operations. Although trawl vessels 
dominate the catch, the pot, longline, and set net fleets harvest 
substantial amounts of fish as well. Third, flexibility in fishing pat-
terns by the predominant trawl fleet suggests that a harvest rights 
system requiring fishermen to specialize in predetermined areas, 
species, or gear might be too restrictive for economical fishing 
operations. Finally. the concentration of harvests in a small por-
tion of the fleet, and the pace of change in fishing technology, 
indicates that simple controls on fleet size cannot be expected to 
wield much control over fishing capacity or harvest levels. 
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This section presents the basic "nuts and bolts" of limited access, 
carrying the discussion of limited entry beyond the general con-
siderations reviewed in previous sections to look at specific 
elements. A proposed checklist of items for consideration, along 
with a brief description of the main options is presented in Figure 
1 below. Seven basic decision categories are: 
(I) Scope of the fishing activity to be restricted or allocated 
(2) Method of limiting access 
(3) Initial allocation of harvest rights 
(4) Transferability of harvest rights 
(5) Longevity of harvest rights 
(6) Mechanisms for adjusting the number of harvest rights 
(7) Handling disputes regarding issuance and transfer of rights. 
In the absence of limited access to the fishery, any U.S. resident 
who pays the appropriate fees to State authorities has a right to fish 
for ground fish. This right is circumscribed by the various restric-
tions on commercial gear (e.g., trawl net minimum mesh size), by 
fishing season closures. by "trip limits," by incidental catch allow-
ances, and prohibitions on retaining salmon and halibut. There is 
no legal restriction, however, on who can participate at any given 
time or place, and no specific restriction on the amount that any 
individual can legally land during a given fishing season. Thus, 
while there are many restrictions on fishing practices, current fishing 
rights are unlimited in number, unrestricted in total harvest amounts, 
and very inexpensive for the individual to maintain. 
The discussion of elements in Figure 1 will focus on a trawl license 
limitation proposal developed in November 1984 by the Fisherman's 
Marketing Association and Coast Draggers Association (FMAI 
CDA) (see Appendix A). Although that proposal is called a mora-
torium, it has the essential features of a license limitation program. 
Of interest here is the contrast between the features outlined in that 
specific proposal and the alternatives listed in Figure I. We will 
proceed through each of the seven categories. 
SCOPE ____________________________ _ 
The FMA/CDA proposal envisions a relatively narrow scope for 
the license limitation program in some respects (limited to trawl 
vessels) and a rather broad scope in other respects (covers entire 
coast and all species of groundfish listed in the management plan 
(Pac. Fish. Manage. Counc. 1982». It leaves out all other com-
mercial gear types and recreational fishing. Except in southern 
California, the recreational component of ground fish catch is too 
small (and will probably remain too small) for this exemption to 
matter much. Ignoring other gear types, however, is a more substan-
tive deletion. Although trawl gear dominates the total catch, gillnet 
fishing is apparently on the rise and may portend greater competi-
tion for fish and space in the future. One strength of this approach 
is that it limits the most important element of the commercial fleet 
while minimizing the number of individual fishing operations that 
must be regulated. 
By including all ground fish species and all fishing sites on the 
west coast. the FMA/CDA proposal would preserve great latitude 
in trawl fishing operations. Trawl vessel operators have suggested 
that they need to have many options open to them under any 
regulatory system. Geographic area and fish species availability are 
two dimensions to these "options," but there are others. For 
example, with a large fishing fleet and great latitude in fishing 
Figure I-Limited Access Program Elements and Options 
I. Scope of nshing activities to be restricted or allocated 
A. Types of fishing to I. All commercial and recreational 
be included 2. All commercial plus for-profit party and 
B. Geographical extent 
C. Fishing gear types 
D. Species of fish 
charter boat fishing 
3. All commercial fishing 
4. Only "big-time" commercial operations, such 
as those landing at least 50 tons of groundfish 
per year. 
I. All Pacific coast including at-sea sales 
2. All Pacific coast shoreside landings 
3. Pacific coast shoreside harvests from the 3-200 
nautical mile zone (FCZ, excluding state 
waters). 
4. Harvests in certain selected INPFC areas such 
as the Vancouver or Columbia areas. 
I. All gear induding ground fish trawl, hook and 
line, fish pots, gill nets, and shrimp trawls. 
2. Control only "directed" fishing with trawl 
gear, fish pots, and gill nets. 
3. Control only the major gear type-tra'Nls (see 
FMA Proposal Appendix A). 
I. All species listed in ground fish fishery 
management plan (Pac. Fish. Manage. Counc. 
1982). 
2. Include only "important" groundfish species 
(e.g., all rockfishes, whiting, sablefish, Dover 
sole, English sole, petrale sole, Pacific cod, 
ling cod). 
3. Focus harvest permits or rights on single 
species or logical groups of species. For ex-
ample, a "rockfish" permit or a "whiting" 
joint venture permit. 
II. Means of limiting access to the nshery 
A. License limitation I. Personal License to fish (with or without 
B. Individual fisherman 
quota (lFQ) 
C. Ta",es, royalties and 
fees 
limiting to "natural persons"). 
2. License attached to vessel 
3. License attached to gear (e.g., net) 
4. Dual system: fishing license for people plus 
vessel or gear permits. 
I. IFQ conveys right 10 take a share of the 
allowable yield of specific slOcks. 
2. IFQ conveys right to take annually a specified 
quantity from a specific stock. 
3. Annual yield is assigned to a company or 
fisherman's cooperative to be subdivided 
among fishermen. ("Enterprise quotas") 
I. Set initial entry fees high enough to discourage 
excessive participation. 
2. Establish landings royalties for fully utilized 
species. 
3. Establish annual license renewal fees. 
III. Basis for initial allocation of harvest rights 
A. Administrative I. Include all persons or firms with recent record 
assignments of landings (e.g., landed at least one fish in 
the past five years). 
2. Include all applicants within a specified time 
period. 
3. Include all persons or firms meeting minlmum 
landings requirements. 
4. Hold a lottery among all applicants. 
5. Include all persons meeting certain qualifica-
tions as commercial fishermen. 
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B. Competitive market 
allocation 
IV. Transferability 
A. Nontransferable 
B. License or IFQ at-
tached 10 specific 
vessel or gear 
C. Fully transferable at 
discretion of owner 
V. Duration of term of 
fIShing right 
I. Auction off limited number of fishing licenses 
or IFQs. 
2. Sell licenses or IFQs at prices calculated to 
reflect market values. 
I. Retirement or death causes termination of 
fishing license or harvest right; may revert 10 
State to be reissued. 
2. Ownership transfer not allowed. but owner 
may lease or lend fishing right. 
Transfer requires sale of vessel or gear. 
2. May be transferred among vessels of equal 
fishing capacity. 
3. May be subject to clearance by State and 
qualification of new owner. 
I. Market sales may be subject to clearance by 
State fisheries agency or review board. 
2. State may require that new vessel have no 
more harvest capacity than previously licensed 
vessel. 
I. Perpetual. The license or IFQ can be used as 
long as the owner wishes. 
2. Annual, renewable or nonrenewable. Renewal 
could be automatic or could depend upon con-
tinued participation in fishery. 
3. Dependent upon lifetime or career of permit 
holder. License or right expires upon death or 
retirement of holder. 
4. Fixed, multiyear term. License or IFQ might 
confer right to fish for. say, 10 years. 
V I. Means of altering number of licenses or nshing rights 
A. Fleet reduction I. Attrition through retirement, termination. 
B. Increase in number 
licenses or rights 
revocation for cause. 
2. Buy-back of perpetual or long-lived licenses 
by State or Federal agency. 
3. Automatic expiration of fixed-term licenses in 
conjunction with issue or sale of reduced 
number of new licenses. 
I. Lottery among "qualified applicants" 
2. Sale to applicants at agency-established price. 
3. Selection of new licensees on first-come, first-
served basis. 
4. Auction of new licenses or rights in com-
petitive market open to all. 
VII. Settling disputes regarding issuance and transfer of nshing rights 
A. State/Federal Court Fishermen can ultimately seek redress in the 
courts under any of the options. 
B. Administrative Law I. AU could make a final administrative ruling 
Judge (AU) after hearing with fisherman. 
2. AU could make recommendation to agency 
administrator after hearing issue. 
C. Special Appeals or I. A board of peers (industry representatives) 
Review Board could make rulings or recommendations to 
agency administrator. 
2. A board of disinterested citizens could hear 
disputes. 
D. Agency 1. Administrator could make final rulings for 
Administrator agency (e.g., NMFS Regional Director). 
2. Administrator could be bound to pass issue to 
Federal department head. 
options, current fish stock conservation regulations have limited 
the ability of trawl vessels to choose timing and quantity of rockfish 
to catch by imposing trip limits and season closures. 
Three alternatives to the FMA/CDA proposal meriting considera-
tion are (I) including all gear types in the license limitation pro-
gram, (2) limiting the scope to "major" ground fish species, and 
(3) permitting small catch levels by unlicensed vessels. Extension 
to all gear types would increase the size of the licensed fleet by 
an order of magnitude, but would bring the various fixed gear vessels 
under control early. This would address the potential future prob-
lem of expanding harvest capacity by an unregulated portion of the 
fishing fleet. Second, the idea of licensing only those vessels fishing 
"major" species would alleviate the need to include in the limited 
fleet every vessel that catches an occasional spiny dogfish or soup-
fin shark. Without restricting the program to major species, the 
extension to all gear types would undoubtedly make the system too 
all-inclusive and cumbersome. 
A third option might be to allow unlicensed vessels to land ground-
fish below a certain limit. All unlicensed vessels could be allowed, 
for example, to land up to 1,000 pounds of groundfish on any trip, 
or up to 10,000 pounds per year. This would permit the minor in-
cidental catch of ground fish by trollers, shrimp vessels, and purse 
seiners without adding these vessels (and the redundant harvest 
capacity they might represent) to a permanent licensed groundfish 
fleet. 
MEANS OF LIMITING ACCESS _____ _ 
The FMA/CDA proposal is for a groundfish fishing license attached 
to the vessel. The principal alternative form of licensing, the per-
sonal fishing license, has been adopted in Alaska and elsewhere. 
The choice between these two license alternatives should have some 
effect on relative bargaining strengths of vessel owners and 
fishermen. With personal licenses limiting the number of people 
who can legally fish, ownership of capital equipment is not a pre-
requisite for ownership of fishing rights. In the Alaska salmon case, 
personal fishing licenses cannot be used as collateral for loans and 
cannot be owned by corporations. These provisions were supposed 
to protect licensed fishermen from some possible threats to their 
continued participation in the fishery. Vessel owners might object 
to this because their ability to continue receiving income from a 
capital investment would depend upon success in recruiting a 
licensed crew. 
Choice between attachment to individuals or vessels must be made 
in designing IFQs as well. If the 1O,000-ton allowable bycatch for 
sable fish were allocated as 500 20-ton IFQs, these could be assigned 
on the basis of historical share to fishermen, to vessel owners, or 
even to corporations involved in fish processing. With personal 
IFQs, a trawl vessel owner would need to hire a skipper or crew-
member holding an IFQ; with share assigned to vessels the owner 
would have control of the harvest right and fishermen not owning 
vessels would be at a disadvantage; and with corporate ownership 
of shares the processors could more easily plan and manage the 
fleet fishing for them. 
A sub-option for IFQs is partial implementation of the system 
for a subset of groundfish stocks. One could allocate the estimated 
annual allowable catch of widow rockfish, sablefish, or Dover sole 
while leaving other species out of the IFQ system. Also, as sug-
gested by Robert Stokes (1983) in his study of north Pacific halibut, 
one could establish IFQs for a portion of the total harvest of a given 
species while retaining a communal fishery for the remainder of 
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the harvest. This option has the advantage of providing a choice 
to fishermen who, for whatever reason, do not want to join a quan-
titative rights system. If one-half of the traditional harvesters of 
Dover sole object to an IFQ system, one could distribute IFQs for 
half the annual yield to those wishing to join the system. The tradi-
tional harvest sector would fish from January I until one-half of 
the annual allowable by catch is taken. Fishermen with IFQs could 
fish whenever they wish, and would probably time their harvest 
to maximize its landed value. 
INITIAL ALWCATION OF 
FISHING RIGHTS __________ _ 
The FMA/CDA proposal would allocate trawl licenses only to cer-
tain groundfish trawlers (I) landing at least 100,000 pounds or (2) 
making at least 12 deliveries during 1984 or (3) demonstrating to 
an industry-governing Board that they had prior involvement in the 
fishery and were active in the north Pacific or Bering Sea trawl 
fishery in 1984 or (4) demonstrating to the Board that they signed 
a contract or began construction or conversion of a trawl vessel 
during 1984. These qualifications would exclude very few ground-
fish trawl fishing vessels from the licensed fleet. For that reason, 
this initial allocation of harvest rights would create no significant 
reduction in harvesting capacity. 
Whether licenses or IFQs are considered, the basic choice here 
is between administrative assignment and some kind of "market 
allocation." Administrative assignments are universally chosen in 
existing limited access programs, largely because government 
agencies (and legislators) are reluctant to take away historically 
established fishing rights. As noted in the Introduction, when 
government regulations are designed to correct technical problems 
of communal resource usage, use rights are generally assigned to 
actual, historic users in order to avoid causing a redistribution of 
wealth. However, when developing new resources (offshore oil) 
or distributing public resources not previously used (National Forest 
timber), government mechanisms tend to use more market-oriented 
allocations (auctions and royalties) which extract resource value 
from the users. 
A case could be made that both historic use and new uses are 
found in the Pacific groundfish fishery. Extensive historic use of 
most flatfish, rockfish, and sablefish by commercial fishing fleets 
could establish an informal "ownership" of the right to harvest. 
At the same time, however, new or developing fisheries have no 
such specific historic use. Pacific whiting, shortbeUy rockfish, sand-
dabs, and possibly other ground fish stocks would be essentially 
"new" from this perspective. A mix of administrative and market 
allocation of initial harvest rights could be justified on this basis. 
Ultimately, there is no technically correct answer to the initial alloca-
tion question. Distribution of public resources can and has been 
done in many ways. 
TRANSFERABILITY OF 
HARVEST RIGHTS _________ _ 
Under the FMA/CDA proposal, the trawl licenses would be trans-
ferred with sale of the vessel and could be shifted from one vessel 
to another by the owner if the licensed vessel is lost or if the owner 
wants to "upgrade" or "downgrade" his vessel. Although the 
license itself would not be saleable under this system, it would be 
fairly easy to perform almost any kind of transfer. For example, 
if a licensed vessel owner wants to take his vessel to a different 
fishery, he could replace his vessel with another and then sell the 
new vessel with license. Or, he could sell the original vessel with 
license to another fisherman, who would then replace the vessel 
and sell the original vessel back to the original owner. There would 
be no apparent market value to a license, but the difference between 
vessel prices with and without a license would provide a good in-
dication of license value. The restriction on sales simply makes 
transactions involving limited harvest rights a cumbersome and 
roundabout process. 
An alternative to this is a fully saleable license. If sufficient 
numbers of licenses or quantitative harvest rights (IFQs) change 
hands on a routine basis, the market allocation of fishing rights 
would have all the advantages and disadvantages of market alloca-
tions that are experienced in sectors of the economy. Market alloca-
tions are presumed to facil itate the efficient entry and ex.it of resource 
users. Less adept or profitable harvesters would be encouraged to 
sell their rights and enter a different line of work, while more effi-
cient operators could expand. No coercion would be necessary, since 
anyone with a license or harvest right would have the option of 
not selling. 
With vessel licenses as proposed by FMA/CDA, sufficient trans-
ferability seems to be incorporated. For an IFQ system to work, 
however, true market sales would be almost a necessity. One alter-
native is for annual harvest quotas to be initially allocated among 
vessel owners in proportion to their historic shares. A vessel owner 
with a vessel that breaks down for an extended time would want 
to sell any quotas he owns to another operator. Also, a vessel which 
is harvesting mostly rockfish may want to shift into shrimp or Dover 
sole fishing. The owner will need to sell one set of quotas and buy 
a new set. Without the freedom of market sales, it would be dif-
ficult to maintain operating flexibility with quantitative harvest 
rights. 
WNGEVITY OF HARVEST RIGHTS ____ _ 
In view of the long-lived investments inherent in both fishing vessels 
and fishing know-how, there seems to be no logical reason for 
licenses or IFQs to expire annually or over a short period of years. 
The FMA/CDA proposal allows perpetual trawl licenses. Only if 
a vessel owner fails to meet minimum landing requirements and 
fails to seek an exemption for his vessel, would a license be 
automatically retired. Personal licenses in Alaska and elsewhere 
are also perpetual. The Pearse Commission recommended that 
British Columbia salmon licenses be issued for a lO-year term, but 
that proposal was part of an intended fleet reduction program that 
would end with issuance of a smaller number of perpetual licenses. 
In a limited access program incorporating all gear types, however, 
it might be useful to issue short-term licenses to vessels that really 
intend to fish only for a short time or which temporarily exceed 
some maximum harvest level allowed for unlicensed vessels. With 
a fully marketable IFQ system, anyone wanting to temporarily enter 
or leave the groundfish fishery would have the opportunity to do so. 
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MECHANISMS FOR ADJUSTING NUMBERS 
OF HARVEST RIGHTS ________ _ 
Under the FMA/CDA proposal, the number of trawl licenses, once 
established, would change only where individual owners allowed 
their licenses to lapse. Because these licenses would be potentially 
valuable in the future, it would be unlikely that significant numbers 
of ves,el owners would voluntarily withdraw from the licensed fleet. 
Assuming that there will be slow attrition from the trawl fishery, 
the FMA/CDA proposal calls for an annual review of the size and 
condition of the fleet. No specific procedures are included, however, 
for either causing more rapid decrease in the fleet or for increas-
ing the number of licenses at some future time. 
To achieve an economically efficient fleet size, some reduction 
in number of vessels would be necessary under a license limitation 
program. On the other hand, an expansion of the currently develop-
able fisheries for Pacific whiting and shortbelly rockfish might justify 
adding to the fleet. 
For fleet reduction, attrition and buyback programs are the only 
frequently discussed alternatives. For attrition to have much effect, 
there must be fairly stringent annual requirements for renewal of 
licenses, and the licenses must not be transferable to new fishermen. 
This approach, therefore, seems to impose a rather arbitrary distri-
bution of fleet reduction burden among fishermen. Also, while 
waiting for attrition to take its toll, many fishermen may be led 
to remain in the fishery when they should not for health or safety 
reasons. 
Buyback of vessel licenses provides a positive means of reducing 
the number of vessels, but it requires a source of funding. In their 
extensive review of buyback of fishing rights, Schelle and Muse 
(1984) found only one that was not a government subsidized 
program. If Congress and state legislatures are not prepared to pro-
vide financing, then fees and royalties from the fishery could be 
used to create a fund for buyback. A large number of technical issues 
need to be addressed in designing a buyback system, including (1) 
determining the target fleet size, choosing (2) whether to buy licenses 
only or to include vessels and gear, and (3) whether to target the 
buyback on a specific distribution of vessel sizes and capacities, 
and (4) determining the specifics of the application and offer 
system. 
One innovative means of reducing vessel numbers was im-
plemented in the British Columbia roe herring license system. The 
fishery was divided into three sub-areas and each licensed fisher-
man was allowed to choose one area. Licenses are saleable, 
however, and a license owner may buy up licenses from all three 
areas. If management authorities stagger the openings of herring 
fishing seasons in the three areas, this method of fleet reduction 
allows consolidation of fishing operations with attendant reductions 
in fishing costs. Potentially, the total number of participants could 
fall to one-third the original number. In fact, from 1981 to 1985 
the total number of licenses fell from 1,557 to 1,132. As of 1985, 
only 17 vessels had three licenses. P. MacGillivray (1986) notes 
that the British Columbia system resulted in both improved product 
quality and reduced fishing costs. 
Under an IFQ system, numbers of participants need not be 
adjusted directly. Instead, the quota initially allocated will be 
redistributed in private market transactions to determine the number 
of participants. With marketable IFQs, adjustment of numbers of 
vessels or fishermen is not administered by the management pro-
gram. Nevertheless, ownership ofIFQs may be restricted to some 
defined class of "qualified" fishermen, and the number of such 
fishermen may be of concern. It is difficult to anticipate what issues 
might arise under such a system in the absence of any experience 
with it or a specific proposal. 
HANDLING DISPUTES ---------
Disputes are likely to arise concerning the initial allocation of harvest 
rights (whether licenses or IFQs), and in exercising the mechanisms 
for license transfer, renewal and tennination. Most existing license 
limitation programs avoid disputes regarding initial allocation by 
including almost every conceivable claimant. Alaska's salmon 
license program did not, much to the chagrin of the Commercial 
Fisheries Entry Commission. The Alaska system required the Entry 
Commission to establish means of determining the extent to which 
applicants met various criteria concerning historic participation and 
dependence on the fishery. Challenges to the Commission's pro-
cedures and decisions still, after 10 years of operation, constitute 
a significant portion of the Commission's business. This could be 
avoided by establishing quantitative criteria in law or regulation 
at the outset, rather than leaving interpretation of some vague criteria 
to a quasiregulatory body. 
To deal with the disputes that occur. several alternative procedures 
could be established. A review board dominated by fishermen and 
other industry members coul.d decide whether individuals should 
be given licenses and whether proposed license or vessel transfers 
should be allowed. A variant on this is to use the board to make 
recommendations to an agency administrator (e.g., an NMFS 
Regional Director) who would make an official ruling. Fishermen 
affected by decisions of the Board may feel that they will get a more 
sympathetic hearing before their peers than before a nonfishing ad-
ministrative or judicial panel. On the other hand, both fishermen 
and the public-at-Iarge occasionally may fear that conflicts of in-
terest or favoritism are more likely to affect the decisions of an 
industry-dominated review board. 
Other approaches could include use of an Administrative Law 
Judge to hear evidence and make recommendations or rulings. 
Agency administrative procedures could be used to hear grievances 
and make rulings. In any case, a fisherman has access to the courts 
to seek redress of arbitrary or wrongful actions by the management 
agency. 
CONCLUSIONS ___________ _ 
A tremendous variety of combinations of limited access program 
elements can and have been attempted. This chapter has introduced 
and explained many of the most commonly discussed alternatives 
under seven categories. Further innovation in developing variants 
on these alternatives will surely be an activity for fishermen, 
managers, and scientists involved in limited access programs. 
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Consideration of fishery limited access leads inevitably to the ques-
tion of how such a program will interact with existing regulations. 
Two of the stated objectives of limited access are to (1) reduce the 
burden of management regulations on the industry and (2) reduce 
the public cost of regulation. Will such programs result in the 
removal of some existing regulations? Will remaining regulations 
be simpler? Or will limited access increase the complexity of regula-
tions by adding a further layer of regulatory and enforcement 
requirements to those already in place? 
The federal regulations for the groundfish fisheries off the coasts 
of Washington, Oregon. and California are divided into two 
categories, "general provisions" and "management measures." 
Only the management measures are relevant to this discussion. They 
may be subdivided further according to functional type, as measures 
which: 
(I) restrain the rate of catch (trip limits); 
(2) limit total catch (optimum yield/quota/harvest guideline); 
(3) change the size of fish at capture through either 
(a) mesh size restrictions, (b) other gear restrictions to make 
mesh size effective, or (c) size restrictions; 
(4) avoid wastage induced by (I), (2), and (3) through 
(a) sable fish incidental catch allowance in the trawl fishery 
when 90% of optimum yield is reached and (b) Pacific ocean 
perch incidental catch allowance (trip limits); and 
(5) avoid gear conflict (gear marking requirements). 
The following discussion focuses on how well a license limita-
tion program or individual fishermen quota (IFQ) program is likely 
to meet the goal of reducing the complexity and cost of regulations. 
LICENSE LIMITATION ________ _ 
License limitation and management 
The type of license limitation program under discussion in this sec-
tion is that assigning general catch rights which control the number 
of fishing vessels with rights to fish. This type of program does 
not in itself control either the type of fishing vessels or the level 
of fishing effort, which, along with the state of the resource at the 
time of license implementation, are crucial to the determination of 
the number and type of regulations required for management. If 
license limitation does not control effective fishing effort, it will 
not protect the biological production of stocks. When resource con-
servation measures are required, measures to curtail fishing effort 
must be in place. Several factors related to the multidimensional 
nature of fishing effort contribute to the need for further effort con-
trol under license limitation. 
A common response to license limitation in a fishery is "capital 
stuffing," the upgrading of the capital stock of the fleet to more 
efficient and flexible vessels. Several reasons for this have been 
enumerated (Townsend 1985), all stemming from the cheaper cost 
of capital in a less risky investment environment. For example, in 
some fisheries banks have been willing to consider the value of a 
fishing license as security in a vessel construction loan. In fisheries 
where this situation exists, vessels tend to have a higher debt ratio 
(ratio of loan value to total vessel value) than in unlicensed fisheries. 
In addition, fleet capacity expands at a more rapid rate than it would 
without the security of high license values. Another effect of capital 
Table i-Performance indicators of five license limitation programs. 
--------------~ 
Level of 
fishery No. of 
Fishery Stability development vessels 
W. Australia rock lobster Fairly Fully Increase 
(Meany 1978) stable exploited 
W. Australia prawn Fairly Undeveloped Increase 
(Meany 1978) stable 
British Columbia salmon Variable Fully Decrease 20 % 
(Fraser 1979; Rettig 1984) developed (buyback) 
Alaska salmon Variable Fully Decrease 
(Adasiak 1978; Rettig 1984) developed 
Japan tuna (first 12 yr) Fairly Developing Increase 
(Keen 1973) stable rapidly 
stuffing is to increase the fishing power of the fleet even as overall 
numbers of vessels decline. 
Effort control is critical to the control of fishing mortality. The 
more specific the license, the more direct the connection between 
restrictions on fishing effort and the control of fishing mortality. 
In a mUltispecies fishery fished by multipurpose vessels covering 
a large geographic area, a license specific to a single species, gear 
type, or subarea would require an impractical, high level of monitor-
ing. A general license giving fishermen needed operating flexibil-
ity will require a lower level of monitoring. However, a general 
license will also have a smaller impact on limiting fishing effort. 
There is a tradeoff between the degree of effort control and the 
cost of enforcement. 
The stage in a fishery's development at which license limitation 
is implemented also affects the number and complexity of supple-
mental regulations required. License limitation that puts a ceiling 
on the number of vessels at the early stages of fishery development 
will, of course, be far more effective at limiting fishing mortality, 
even with subsequent increases in fishing effort, than will a pro-
gram implemented after a fishery is fully developed (Rettig 1984). 
The state of the resource determines whether there is any slack to 
absorb the increase in fishing effort that will follow license 
limitation. 
Some examples of license limitation programs 
A review of some existing license limitation programs offers sup-
porting evidence to the general conclusion that license limitation 
in itself will not change the number or type of other regulations 
used to manage the fishery. Table 1 summarizes performance in-
dicators for several fisheries managed under license limitation. It 
is important to note (cf Rettig 1984) that to compare the levels of 
regulation before and after license limitation tells us nothing about 
the number or type of regulations that might be in place had license 
limitation never been implemented. The histories of fisheries 
managed without license limitation are also characterized by a 
tendency toward increased fishing power through more and larger 
vessels, increased fishing effort, declining fishery profits, and an 
increasing complexity of regulations over time. 
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Fleet capacity No. and Fishermen 
and effective complexity of Fleet bargaining 
fishing effon regulations profits power 
Increase Increase High and Increase 
stable 
Increase N/A High Processor-
owned fleet 
Increase Increase Variable Increase 
Increase Increase Variable Increase 
Increase Increase Variable Processor-
owned fleet 
Some general similarities can be seen among the programs. In 
all programs, regardless of whether the number of vessels has 
increased or decreased under license limitation, effective fishing 
effort has increased resulting from internal shifts in fleet structure. 
Investment of capital in fleets has led to more efficient vessels with 
upgraded technology and increased capacity. 
Once the license to fish is limited, it acqui,'es value which in many 
cases results in easier access to capital markets by fishermen. In 
fisheries where prices have kept ahead of rising costs, profits earned 
by fishermen have also increased, and a substantial proportion of 
these profits have been reinvested in vessels. Fraser (1978) notes 
that the investment response to changes in resource value may be 
even greater under a system of license limitation than under open 
access because fishermen have a firmer expectation of capitalizing 
on that investment. 
When the vessel composition of the fleet shifts toward more 
capital-intensive vessels, fishing mobility, operating flexibility, and 
search efficiency are increased. Unless there has been a substan-
tial offsetting fleet reduction or an increase in the size of the resource 
base, fishery managers are faced with the need to institute resource 
conservation regulations to limit fishing mortality. The net result, 
under both license limitation and open access systems, is that ef-
fective fishing effort increases. Further regulations are then required 
to prevent resource overexploitation. In general, regulations tend 
to become more numerous and more complex after license limita-
tion programs are in place. 
The timing of license limitation in relation to the state of fishery 
development is of critical importance. License limitation programs 
instituted in a developing fishery or before serious problems are 
widespread will likely require fewer additional regulations than 
programs put in place after problems of overcapitalization and over-
exploitation are severe. In a fully developed fishery, license limita-
tion in itself will not decrease fishing effort although it may slow 
the rate of increase in effort. When evaluating the level of regula-
tions required under license limitation programs, the valid com-
parison is between the number and complexity of regulations at a 
particular time period to what they might have been had license 
limitation not been implemented. It is apparent from these five ex-
amples of license limitation programs that restricting the number 
of general licenses to fish will not reduce the number, complexity, 
or cost of management regulations. 
To summarize, because license limitation does not in itself change 
either the nature of competition or the state of the resource, it can-
not stand alone as a fishery management tool. There is nothing in 
license limitation that would preclude the continued need for con-
servation measures such as quotas, trip limits. and gear regulations. 
License limitation would pose particular problems in the west coast 
groundfishery. Due to the vast geographic area, multispecies catch, 
and flexibility of multipurpose vessels. licenses to fish would have 
to encompass a large number of species and areas. A license limita-
tion program without additional regulations could well serve to in-
crease effective fishing effort through an overall increase in fleet 
capacity. 
Given the current state of some Sebastes stocks, an increase in 
fishing effort under either open access or license limitation would 
provide the justification for even more stringent trip and trip fre-
quency limits. Effort limitation is a continuing problem even in pro-
grams with provisions for vessel buybacks. The need for continuous 
regulatory measures to limit fishing effort makes it unlikely that 
either the number or the cost of regulations in the west coast ground-
fishery would decline under a general license limitation program. 
Individual fisherman quotas 
IFQs are property rights to given volumes of fish. As such, they 
can only be expected to resolve problems related to volumes of fish. 
Thus, the establishment of an IFQ system will have direct bearing 
on those measures designed to limit the rate of catch and the total 
volume of catch (regulation categories I and 2), but will have no 
direct bearing on the problems of size at capture and gear conflicts 
(categories 3 and 5). Similarly, measures to avoid wastage which 
are tied to volume control (sablefish and Pacific ocean perch in-
cidental catch allowances) are directly affected by IFQs, while those 
wastage measures tied to control of age at catch (shrimp and pelagic 
trawl incidental catch allowances) are not affected. 
The interaction between IFQs and other ground fish regulations 
depends on how the IFQs are defined and restricted. For this discus-
sion, it will be assumed that IFQs for key ground fish species have 
been allocated in some manner to ground fish fishermen, with aggre-
gate IFQs or no quotas at all for the remaining species. It is further 
assumed that IFQs are divisible into relatively small units and that 
they are freely transferable. The shares are not" attached" to the 
vessel or to the vessel owner; they are simply owned, and all that 
is required is that fish being landed must be credited to a particular 
owner's account. Finally, it is assumed that the system has been 
in place long enough for an orderly share market to have developed 
and for fishermen to have learned how to account for the IFQ system 
in their planning and other decisions. 
This IFQ system, if adequately enforced, will control the land-
ings of key species as effectively as a fleet quota system. However, 
some concerns have been raised that IFQs will cause discards to 
increase. This probably would not happen for key species due to 
the fact that shares may be taken anytime during the year, without 
fear of fishery closures. Fishermen planning to fish several species 
at once will have a strong incentive to acquire shares for all the 
key species they expect to catch. Thus, for example, a fisherman 
who plans to fish Dover sole in the fall will want to acquire sable fish 
shares along with necessary Dover sole shares to cover his expected 
sablefish bycatch. If individual fishermen can predict their catches 
and can obtain shares at pricing allowing profitable operations, they 
will be able to land both species with no substantial discards. 
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Under a fleet quota system the sablefish fishery is likely to be 
closed during the fall so that any sable fish bycatch during this period 
would be discarded. The existing modified quota system restricts 
trawlers to a small incidental per-trip catch of sablefish after 90% 
of the annual quota is taken. This reduces discards to the amount 
of by catch in excess of the trip limit. With the IFQ system, discards 
of marketable key species will take place only when fishermen 
underestimate their bycatch and cannot obtain additional shares 
before returning to port. Given a well developed share market, stable 
conditions in the fishery, ready access to reliable economic and 
biological information (e.g., future prices, reliable stock assess-
ments), and rational decision makers (e.g., fishermen. processors, 
and government regulators), there would be very few such discards. 
However. unanticipated fluctuations in species availability and 
exvessel prices are currently a fact of life for some ground fish 
species (especially Pacific whiting and sablefish). Significant 
discards of any species subject to an IFQ or other quota could be 
induced by such unanticipated changes. In general, however, 
discards of key species should be less extensive under the IFQ 
system than under other forms of management, and fishing mor-
tality therefore should be controlled more precisely. 
Discards of species covered by aggregate IFQs may be induced 
by this system if the aggregates include two or more species caught 
together for which there are significantly different exvessel prices. 
Under these conditions fishermen might find it profitable to catch 
both species but discard the less valuable one. This can be prevented 
by establishing separate IFQs on the key species within the aggre-
gate. It also may be avoided by simply not establishing IFQs for 
minor species. Since the potential for fishery development lies most-
ly within the non-key species, these aggregates could simply be left 
without any kind of quotas. The resulting incentive to fish non-quota 
species could hasten full utilization. 
The major difference between IFQs and the current groundfish 
management regime which gives rise to the possibility of eliminating 
some regulations is the fact, already mentioned, that share owners 
may plan their fishing activities throughout the year without worry-
ing about the fishery being closed before they fill their IFQs. In 
addition to providing for incidental catch, as described above, 
fishermen can be expected to respond to seasonal patterns of ex-
vessel prices and costs of harvesting in determining when they will 
catch their IFQs. Processors will also have an easier time schedul-
ing an even rate of deliveries throughout the year. Consequently, 
an IFQ system should eliminate the need for government-imposed 
trip limits to provide for a continuous, steady supply of fish. 
The IFQ system could eliminate the need for incidental catch 
allowances in fisheries where the gear being used is appropriate 
to the incidental species, as is the case for Pacific ocean perch. Given 
full access to information and rational profit maximizing behavior, 
fishermen will provide for an incidental catch of Pacific ocean perch 
by acquiring shares. Other incidental catch allowances, such as those 
for shrimp and pelagic trawls, still will be needed because it will 
be necessary to prevent targeting on most ground fish with small 
mesh nets. 
Insofar as the IFQ system reduces effort in the fishery, it will 
mitigate gear conflict and age-at-capture problems. However, the 
need for mesh size restrictions, size limits, and gear marking re-
quirements will persist. As long as the price for fish does not vary 
by size (over the range normally caught by trawls), it will be more 
profitable for the individual fisherman to land smaller fish whenever 
this will reduce his fishing time. This will sometimes involve the 
use of a smaller mesh net than would be desirable for the economy 
as a whole. Thus, mesh size restrictions will still be needed. Size 
limits may be needed for the same reason. although the price dif-
ferential by size in the sablefish case is probably great enough in 
some years to induce fishennen to save their quotas for larger, higher 
valued fish. 
CONCLUSIONS ______________________ _ 
In summary, a well designed and enforced IFQ system could be 
expected eventually to supplant quotas or other harvest guidelines 
and to eliminate the need for trip limits and incidental catch allow-
ances for domestic trawl-caught Pacific ocean perch and sablefish. 
There will be a learning period following initial IFQ implementa-
tion during which these measures may still be required. Other 
management measures, such as mesh-size restrictions, incidental 
catch allowances for shrimp and pelagic trawls, sablefish size limits, 
and gear marking regulations still will be required for good manage-
ment of the ground fish fishery. 
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In deciding whether to adopt a limited access system, one considera-
tion would be the economic benefits and costs. To pass the benefit-
cost test, the potential economic benefits must exceed the total public 
and private costs of public program implementation. This chapter 
summarizes the results of an effort to estimate potential economic 
returns from the groundfish trawl fishery. Chapter 6 presents available 
information on possible administrative costs. 
The economic benefit calculation is abstracted from Huppert and 
Squires (1986). Benefits from limited access are presumed to occur 
through increased economic efficiency in fishing fleet construction 
and deployment. Thus the estimated benefits are derived from a model 
which calculates, under stated conditions and assumptions, the total 
fleet profit possible with an optimal fleet size and optimal deploy-
ment of fishing effort. 
TRAWL FLEET PROFITS ________ _ 
The mathematical model used to calculate potential economic profits 
is not intended to describe an actual limited access program. Instead, 
it computes the optimal solution to the fishing fleet construction and 
deployment problem as though there is a profit-seeking centralized 
manager of the fishery. This hypothetical manager operates the fleet 
as if he is starting from scratch. That is, he does not take into con-
sideration the investments sunk into the existing fishing fleet. There-
fore, our estimate of maximum economic returns for the fleet is a 
hypothetical one, describing an ideal result that could be achieved 
only after a long period of adjustment. We cannot recommend that 
the trawl fleet be forced into conformance with our computed op-
timum fleet by a limited access program. This hypothetical model 
is useful, nevertheless, because it yields a reasonable estimate of what 
can be achieved in a commercial fishery when the trawl fleet is 
managed to maximize economic profit. 
The Pacific trawl fishery's optimum economic return is computed 
by linear programming. This procedure calculates the maximum 
economic profit available to the entire fleet given that the fleet's total 
catch cannot exceed allowable catch levels. Vessels with non-trawl 
gear are assumed to continue catching a portion of the total harvest 
as observed during 1981-84. To implement the linear program, we 
have to establish catch rates, exvessel prices, and costs of fishing 
for trawl vessels. Amounts of fishing effort for vessels in each of 
five length classes are expressed in number of fishing weeks. Each 
vessel is assumed to be capable of fishing a certain number of weeks 
during each calendar quarter. Each element of the model has been 
derived from data collected during the last few years as summarized 
below. 
Allowable catch levels for eight ground fish species and species 
groups were adopted from the Pacific Fishery Management Council's 
(1985) estimates for 1985. The proportion of the allowable catches 
to be taken by the trawl fleet is assumed to equal the average pro-
portion observed during 1981-84. Pacific whiting presented a special 
problem because it is taken mainly in the joint venture fishery. We 
examined three different levels for the joint venture Pacific whiting 
catch centered on the 1984 harvest level. Maximum annual harvest 
of pink shrimp by trawlers was set at the average 1981-82 total catch 
(which is close to the recent 12-year average harvest). The average 
annual trawl fleet catch in 1981-82 was also used to determine the 
Dungeness crab allowable catch level. Finally, the linear program-
ming model assumes that vessels do not fish more than the typical 
number of weeks fished by very active trawlers during 1981 and 1982. 
The Pacific trawl fishery is considered to have six distinct pro-
duction processes or fishing modes: (1) mixed-species groundfish 
trawling in the Vancouver-Columbia area, (2) mixed-species ground-
fish trawling in the Eureka area, (3) mixed-species groundfish trawling 
in the Monterey area, (4) single-species pink shrimp trawling, (5) 
single-species Dungeness crab pot harvesting, and (6) single-species 
joint venture fishing for Pacific whiting. Eight species categories are 
caught in the groundfish modes: Dover sole, other flatfish, cod and 
lingcod, widow rockfish, other rockfish, whiting, sablefish, and a 
miscellaneous category. The study considers the four calendar-year 
quarters and five vessel size classes: (I) 40-49 ft., (2) 50-59 ft., (3) 
60-69 ft., (4) 70-79 ft., and (5) 80-95 ft. All lengths are Coast Guard 
registered lengths. 
Multispecies groundfish, shrimp, and Dungeness crab catch rates 
were obtained from the PACFIN research data base (Huppert et al. 
1984) maintained at the Southwest Fisheries Center in La Jolla. 
Average weekly catches for 1981-82 were computed for each fishing 
mode, area, size class, and season. Catch rates for Pacific whiting 
joint venture fishing were based upon information from private com-
panies and financial reports. Cost data covering the years 1980-83 
were used to estimate average weekly operating costs and annual 
fixed costs for each length class. Exvessel fish prices were taken 
from the PACFIN management data base at the Northwest and Alaska 
Fisheries Center in Seattle. All of these estimates were combined 
in the program to compute the fleet's profit (gross exvessel value 
of harvest minus fleetwide operating and fixed costs) for any com-
bination of weeks fished and number of vessels. To provide a baseline 
for comparison, the prospective fleet profit was calculated for the 
1984 trawl fleet while assuming the pattern of fishing weeks observed 
for the fleet in 1982. This baseline estimate does not correspond to 
the actual trawl fleet profit in 1984, but it does offer a represen-
tative benchmark reflecting the fleet's current economic status. 
Table 1 displays a summary of the main results from the linear 
program. The first column of data in Table 1, representing the 
baseline 1984 fleet, shows a $10 million loss under the assumed con-
ditions. Columns 2 through 4 report that the trawl fleet could achieve 
a total profit of between $7.6 and $17.7 million per year depending 
upon the size of the joint venture whiting fishery. Without a joint 
venture fishery, the optimum hypothetical fleet would have 238 
vessels and would generate $7.6 million in profits annually. Adding 
a 1984-level joint venture fishery increases the optimum hypothetical 
fleet to 265 vessels and the annual profit to $11.96 million. Should 
the joint venture fishery expand to harvest the entire Pacific whiting 
maximum sustainable yield, the optimum fleet operated by the hypo-
thetical manager would have 338 vessels earning $17.7 million in 
profits per year. This indicates that the estimated profit and fleet size 
are sensitive to the assumed level of joint venture activity, an 
unsurprising result. Because the joint venture fishery employs foreign 
processing vessels, however, the likely size of this fishery depends 
upon domestic politics and foreign economic policies as well as 
standard economic considerations such as the Pacific whiting price 
and operating costs. 
The most reasonable assumption might be that the joint venture 
fishery remains at the 1984 size. In this case the optimum fleet would 
enjoy an increase of over $22 million per year from that of a baseline. 
Slightly more than one-third of the profit is due to multispecies 
ground fish trawling, about one-quarter comes from shrimp harvesting, 
about one-quarter is from joint venture fishing of Pacific Whiting, 
and only one-tenth is from crab harvesting. 
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Table I-Results of linear progranunlng for the Pacific trawl Deel. 
JV = joint venture; MSY = rna ... sustainable yield. 
Class I 
Class 2 
Class 3 
Class 4 
Class 5 
Total 
Proportion from J: 
Shrimp fishing 
Crab fishing 
Joint venture fishing 
Groundfish 
Proportion in: 
Shrimp fishing 
Crab fishing 
Joint venture fishing 
Groundfish 
Baseline 
fleet in 
1984' 
106 
ll8 
138 
55 
12 
429 
$-10.25 
0.324 
0.038 
0.306 
0.332 
11,763 
0.218 
0.044 
0.074 
0.664 
JY takes 
whiting 
MSY 
Optimum fishery2 
1984 
JV 
harvest 
Number of vessels 
0 0 
245 180 
0 0 
93 85 
0 0 
338 265 
Profit ($million) 
$17.7 $11.96 
0.180 0.267 
0.081 0.109 
0.475 0.263 
0.264 0.360 
Total weeks 
11,034 9,041 
0.320 0.380 
0.042 0.050 
0.280 0.130 
0.358 0.440 
With 
no JY 
fishery 
0 
180 
0 
58 
0 
238 
$7.61 
0.362 
0.143 
0.000 
0.495 
8,054 
0.440 
0.060 
0.000 
0.500 
'The 1984 baseline fleet does not represent an optimum distribution of fishing 
weeks. The number and size distribution of vessels represents the 1984 fleet, while 
the distribution of weeks fished is taken from the 1982 PACFIN research data base 
(Huppert and Thomson 1985). All prices and costs used in calculating profits are 
in 1984 dollars. 
2Yanous joint venture harvest constraints all assume pink shrimp harvest con-
straint equals average 1981-82 catch (17,218 short tons). 
JThis is the proportion of operating profit (or net revenue), not economic profit. 
Fixed costs of vessels are not allocated among fisheries in calculating this proportion. 
The size distribution of vessels in the hypothetical fleet operated 
by a centralized manager differs markedly from the baseline fleet. 
The optimum hypothetical fleet is composed of 180 vessels in the 
50-59 ft. size class and 85 vessels in the 70-79 ft. size class. Absence 
of the largest and smallest vessel size classes in the optimum fleet 
is perhaps not unexpected. The surprising absence of mid-sized 
trawlers in the 60-69 ft. size class in the optimum hypothetical fleet 
evidently occurs because the greater harvest rates achieved by these 
vessels, as compared with 50-59 ft. vessels, do not sufficiently 
counterbalance the proportionately greater increase in harvesting 
costs. 
The analysis does not consider all important aspects of fishing vessel 
size, however, and these results should not be taken as defmitive 
regarding optimum vessel size. The linear programming approach, 
for example, does not consider safety, crew comfort, or seaworthiness 
of the vessels. It also ignores the flexibility that a large vessel may 
have for cruising to Alaska and for remaining at sea during storms. 
Relatively small changes in vessel construction or operating cost may 
cause the linear program to designate that a given size vessel is more 
Table 2-Optimum economic values as trawl fleet size is reduced sequentiaUy 
while maintaining the 1984 size distribution of vessels. Assumes the 1984 level 
of joint venture Whiting catch, and 1981-82 average pink shrimp catch. 
Trawl Total 
fleet fleet Total Fixed Variable Total 
size profit revenue cost cost weeks 
- - - - - - - - - - - - ($millions) - - - - - - - - - - - - fished 
1984 base' 429 3.6 73.7 27.5 42.6 10,006 
-10% 385 5.5 72.4 24.8 42.1 9,883 
-20% 343 6.5 70.4 22.0 41.9 9,885 
-30% 301 7.1 66.0 19.3 39.6 9,178 
-40% 258 7.3 58.3 16.5 34.5 7,970 
-50% 215 7.2 49.8 13.8 28.8 6,641 
-60% 171 6.9 40.7 11.0 22.8 5,273 
-70% 129 6.5 32.4 8.3 17.6 4,049 
-80% 86 5.8 24.3 5.5 13.0 2,291 
-90% 44 3.0 12.4 2.8 6.6 1,496 
'Baseline is 1984 trawl fleet with an optimal allocation of fishing weeks across 
seasons, areas, and fishing modes. 
advantageous than another, while in reality decisions on vessel size 
must recognize these unquantified factors as well as captain's or 
owner's preferences. 
The level and distribution of weeks fished by fishing mode and 
vessel size class (aggregated over seasons) also differ between the 
baseline and optimum hypothetical fleets. The optimum fleet's total 
weeks fished is 9,041, a decline of about 31 % from the baseline. 
All of the fishing time in the optimum hypothetical fleet is concen-
trated in the second and fourth vessel length classes: 63% in Class 
2, and 37% in Class 4. Several other important changes in fishing 
patterns occur in the optimum hypothetical fleet: the proportion of 
weeks fished for pink shrimp trawling increases from 22 % to 38 % 
of the total; mixed-species groundfish trawling declines by almost 
one-tillrd; and joint venture fishing for Pacific whlting almost doubles 
from 7% of the total to 13%. 
Further characteristics of the optimum trawl fleet are examined 
in detail in Huppert and Squires (1986) referenced above. It is shown 
that the size of this hypothetical optimum fleet is strongly influenced 
by the size of the pink shrimp fishery. Also, the conclusions are 
relatively insensitive to variations in fixed costs, weeks available for 
fishing per year, and catch rates for Dungeness crab and rockfish. 
The optimum hypothetical fishery would not fuUy utilize the available 
sustainable yields of Dover sole, other flatfish, Pacific cod and 
lingcod, sablefish, or miscellaneous species. It would fully or near-
ly completely utilize the sustainable yields of widow rockfish, other 
rockfish, pink shrimp, and Pacific whiting to the extent permitted 
by the joint venture fishery. 
As noted earlier, these results are pertinent to a hypothetical fleet 
manager who does not have to deal with the exjsting trawl fleet. Given 
the current number and size distribution of trawlers, a manager might 
suboptimize by deploying the exjsting fleet's fishing weeks across 
seasons, areas, and fishing modes, As depicted in the first row of 
Table 2, this restricted profit maximization generates an annual fleet 
profit of $3.60 million. The hypothetical central manager might try 
to expand annual profit by reducing the number of vessels through 
attrition. We assume that attrition reduces all size classes in propor-
tion. As shown in Tables 2 and 3, the fixed and variable costs of 
fishing would fall faster than the total revenue earned as the fleet 
is reduced up to 40 % from the base 1984 level. The maxjmum fleet 
profit through this attrition program is only $7.3 million. 
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Table 3-Capacity utilization with 10 to 90% reductions in vessel numbers. 
Assuming 1984 size distribution of vessels, 1984 level of joint venture whiting 
catch, and 1981-82 average pink shrimp catch. 
Percent utilization 
Trawl 
fleet Class Class Class Class Class 
size I 2 3 4 5 
1984 base 429 79.5 81.5 48.3 69.1 0.0 
-10% 385 79.5 98.9 53.1 82.4 0.0 
-20% 343 100.0 100.0 65.3 100.0 0.0 
-30% 301 100.0 100.0 92.2 100.0 0.0 
-40% 258 100.0 100.0 75.8 100.0 0.0 
-50% 215 100.0 100.0 75.8 100.0 0.0 
-60% 171 100.0 100.0 75.8 100.0 0.0 
-70% 129 100.0 100.0 80.6 100.0 0.0 
-80% 86 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 
-90% 44 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 
In evaluating the attrition program, we require that the hypothetical 
manager pay the fixed costs of maintaining the prescribed fleet, but 
we do not require that all vessels actually be deployed in the fishery. 
Some vessels may well be treated as surplus capacity and tied up 
to the dock. Table 3 shows the percent utilization of the total fishing 
weeks available to the manager with each fleet size, In particular, 
tills shows that the Class 5 vessels are so uneconomic that they would 
not be used even though the manager is charged the substantial fixed 
cost for interest and depreciation. If the Class 5 vessels were not 
in the fleet, revenue from harvests would be unaffected, but the cost 
would be reduced by $110,550 per vessel. Without Class 5 vessels, 
the annual fleet profit would rise to $4.9 million with the 1984 base 
fleet, and to $8.1 million with a fleet reduced by 40%. 
The current fleet is a multipurpose fleet composed of trawlers 
which, depending upon conditions, might target mixed-species 
ground fish, pink shrimp, Dungeness crab, or Pacific whlting through 
joint venture operations. The set of results presented in Table 4 
demonstrates the economic importance of maintaining a multipurpose 
fleet. Columns 1-3 show the optimum vessel numbers, total fleet 
profit, and weeks fished for three hypothetical specialized fleets 
harvesting (I) only multispecies groundfish and crab, (2) only pink 
shrimp, and (3) only joint venture Pacific whiting at the 1984 level. 
Each of these three separately operated fleets could be profitable. 
Yet, the sum of the three fleets would contain 149 more vessels, 
would yield $3.78 million less in annual profits, and would fish 1,061 
weeks more than an optimal hypothetical multipurpose fleet. This 
result suggests that a limited access program seeking to improve fleet 
profits should not create divisions in the fleet based upon exclusive 
licensing for groundfish, pink shrimp, and joint venture Pacific 
whlting fishing. 
In summary, the analysis of the Pacific coast trawl fishery sug-
gests a maximum fleet annual economic profit of around $12 million. 
This represents the total profit that might be attained by a hypothetical 
central manager designing a new trawl fleet. The maximum economic 
surplus from thls hypothetical fleet occurs with a trawl fleet about 
38% smaller than the fleet existing in 1984, with a 23% reduction 
in weeks fished. Without altering the size distribution of vessels, a 
reduction of about 40% in the trawl fleet would yield a profit of 
around $7 million, again assuming the fishing weeks are optimalJy 
deployed among seasons, fishlng areas, and fishing modes. 
Table 4-Comparison of specialized and multipurpose optimum trawl fleets 
assuming 1984 joint venture (JV) barvest and 1981-82 average pink shrimp 
harvest. 
Specialized fleets 
Groundfishl Shrimp JV whiting 
crab only only only 
Number of vessels 
Class I 61 0 0 
Class 2 36 154 77 
Class 3 0 0 0 
Class 4 42 0 0 
Class 5 0 0 0 
Total 139 154 77 
Profit ($miJlion) 
$4.12 $0.217 $3.85 
Weeks fished 
4,724 3,929 1,449 
Total 
61 
267 
0 
42 
0 
370 
$8.18 
10,102 
Change from 
multipurpose 
fleet 
-----
+61 
+87 
0 
-43 
0 
+105 
$-3.78 
+1,061 
NON-TRAWL FLEET __________ _ 
If the entire groundfish fishery is placed under a limited access system, 
the potential profits would be somewhat larger than that estimated 
for the trawl fleet alone. During the base period of 1981-84, the fixed 
gear fleet took the folJowing portions of the total Pacific coast ground-
fish harvest: 12% of cod and lingcod, 6% of other rockfish, 42 % 
of sablefish, and 7% of the miscellaneous fish. Assuming that the 
fixed gear fleet would continue to take these portions of the total 
allowable catches, and that it receives the same exvessel prices as 
trawlers, the non-trawl gross revenue would be about $3.5 million. 
Without incorporating non-trawl fishing cost information, we can-
not accurately estimate the level of profits that this would generate. 
As a first approximation, however, we could assume that profits 
would be the same percentage of gross revenue (i.e., total ex vessel 
value of harvests) for fixed gear as for trawlers. For the trawl fleet 
as a whole, profits would be about 17.5% of gross revenue for the 
optimum fishery. Our corresponding educated guess of non-trawl 
groundfish profits would be about $605,000. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR LIMITED ACCESS ___ _ 
The total potential economic profit of $12.6 million represents an 
annual commercial profit under very specialized conditions. This is 
a useful rough assessment of net economic benefit attributable to the 
harvesting of commercial groundfish. It is not clear, however, that 
this is a reasonable assessment of potential benefits from limiting 
access to the fishery. There are two main concerns. First, achieve-
ment of this total profit requires a trawl fleet that is substantially 
different from the fleet existing today. But any real limited access 
program must begin with today's fishing fleet. Also, without detailed 
consideration of several additional vessel design factors, one cannot 
be very confident that these particular changes in vessel size distribu-
tion will be as beneficial as the model predicts. Second, the prac-
tical means of limiting access cannot literally mimic the centralized 
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decision-maker concept, and hence cannot necessarily result in the 
level of fleet profits calculated. License limitation, for example, would 
not result in the optimal deployment of fishing effort that the mathe-
matical model recommends. To achieve the economically optimal 
deployment across species, areas. and seasons, either the manager 
must wield incredibly detailed direct control over the fleet or the in-
dependent vessel operators must have economic incentives that lead 
them to the optimal solution. Discussion of these two concerns should 
place this chapter in proper perspective. 
Any limited access system likely to be adopted in a commercial 
fishery would undoubtedly begin by "grandfathering in" the existing 
fishing fleet. Thus the optimum vessel numbers and size configura-
tion would not be adopted immediately. A more reasonable estimate 
of potential profit would be the $7.3 million shown in Table 3. Adding 
the non-trawl profit to this gives us an estimate of about $8 million 
per year. This is our current best estimate of the size of potential 
profits from the fishery under the conditions assumed by our 
mathematical model. 
The second concern is that practical limited access systems may 
not be able to approximate the optimum fleet management assumed 
in the model. Experience with license limitation programs, for ex-
ample, shows that limiting numbers of vessels or fishermen does not 
effectively limit the level of fishing effort, nor does it necessarily 
lead to an optimal redeployment of effort to maximize overall 
economic benefit. Increased investment in fishing capacity by licensed 
vessels can cancel out the capacity-reducing effects of limiting number 
of participants, and this will cut into the potential profit. Various 
restraints may be placed upon fishing capacity in order to prevent 
this from happening. Improvements in fishing technology, comfort, 
and safety aboard commercial vessels, however, will all involve 
capital investments. In the long run we cannot prevent these changes 
in order to preserve economic profits. Thus it is difficult to imagine 
a license limitation program that would preserve both economic profits 
and technological progressiveness. 
Of equal concern is the conservation effect of excess fishing effort. 
Even though their numbers may be limited, the fishing fleets for 
salmon, halibut, and herring roe (to name just three examples) must 
be further restricted in order to conserve fish stocks. As explained 
in Chapters I and 4, the limit on licenses helps to create a group 
of common resource users who may coordinate their actions to op-
timize the resource harvest. But the act of limiting membership to 
the group of harvesters does not immediately assure the high degree 
of cooperative behavior needed to achieve optimum results. The kinds 
of restrictions placed upon fishing fleets to restrain fishing effort in 
these circumstances often cause increases in fishing costs. Again, 
this would prevent the fleet from achieving the potential economic 
profits. It seems more likely that quantitative harvest rights systems, 
such as New Zealand's Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs), will 
succeed at meeting the multiple economic objectives of an efficient 
harvesting industry. But there are potential problems with the ITQ 
system as well, including enforcement and control of discards. Thus 
the economic benefit estimates developed in this chapter should be 
taken as a sort of target level which mayor may not be achievable 
with a practical limited access program. 
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In Chapter 5 the potential economic benefits resulting from a 
reduction in the groundfish fishery fleet size are discussed. Imple-
menting an access limitation program to aid in realizing these 
benefits would not be without costs. The costs of administering and 
enforcing the limited access system must not be so burdensome as 
to outweigh any potential benefits. While accurately quantifying 
the costs of limiting access is not possible without extensive 
knowledge of the specific enforcement and administrative pro-
cedures required for a given program, some generic problems will 
be examined below. In addition, information will be presented on 
mechanisms to deal with these problems derived from an examina-
tion of individual fishermen's quota (IFQ) systems currently 
operating or in the process of being implemented in Canada, Iceland. 
Australia, and New Zealand. Finally, comments on necessary en-
forcement and administrative procedures will be summarized for 
some "sample" programs solicited from enforcement experts 
familiar with the Pacific Coast ground fish fishery. 
LICENSE LIMITATION ________ _ 
License limitation forms of limited access require that records of 
ownership be maintained, that a mechanism for hearing appeals from 
individuals denied a permit be set up, and that enforcement per-
sonnel easily identify legal permit holders. It is likely that other 
regulations such as trip limits would continue to be necessary under 
a license limitation program so that the costs of administering and 
enforcing the limited access system would be added to existing costs 
(see Chapter 4). 
Initial allocation 
When designing a license limitation scheme, one of the first ques-
tions which must be answered is who is going to be included and 
excluded. A number of criteria can be used to make this determina-
tion, including ones related to the factors listed in section 303(b)6 
of the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act. 
Regardless of the criteria chosen, it is important that they be as 
objective and specific as possible in order to minimize the ad-
ministrative work load. An example of how the choice of criteria 
can impact the administrative workload can be found in the Alaskan 
limited entry experience. In the first limited entry regulations, the 
past participation provision stipulated that if an individual was ex-
cluded in any year by "unavoidable circumstances," he or she 
would get credit for that year. An unavoidable circumstance was 
defined as "one beyond control, unforeseen or unavoidable in any 
way. " Twenty-five percent of the denied applications under these 
subjective criteria resulted in administrative hearings, and there are 
still people who have not received a final decision on their applica-
tion but who have been fishing on interim permits since 1975. In 
subsequent limited entry programs, efforts were taken to make the 
criteria much more objective. As a result, only about 12 % of the 
denied applications required a trial-like hearing (R. MilJer 1984). 
Many limited entry programs have begun with a moratorium on 
new entry, with everyone currently or recently participating in the 
fishery being "grand fathered in." Moratoriums are viewed as 
interim steps toward a more structured limited entry program and 
frequently result in a larger "fleet" than was originaHy actively 
fishing. They have advantages in that they clearly identify the pool 
of fishermen which should be involved in the design and discus-
sion of subsequent limited access measures. Identifying the popula-
tion of fishennen who will be fishing can also aid in the management 
of the resource. This has proven to be the case in the mid-Atlantic 
surf clam fishery. Prior to imposition of the moratorium, there were 
650 licenses outstanding, although during many years the active 
fleet numbered closer to 120. Of the 650 licenses, 145 qualified 
under the moratorium and 130 fished last year. There is a belief 
among managers that the moratorium aided in the recovery of the 
resource (E. Nichols, Northeast Region, Natl. Mar. Fish. Serv., 
Gloucester, MA. NOAA, pers. commun.). 
Monitoring and enforcement 
After initial allocation of licenses, a record of transfers of licenses 
and current pennit holders must be maintained. In addition, an ad-
ministrative procedure must be designed to handle related issues 
such as monitoring minimum landing requirements (e.g., at least 
one salmon must be landed to maintain eligibility in the Oregon 
and Washington salmon moratoria) and new entry provisions. On 
the west coast, Alaska, Oregon, and California have set up pennit 
boards to address these issues. Enforcement costs should be 
minimal, as vessels are already being monitored for trip tonnage 
and frequency limits. In general, however, the more complex a 
license limitation program, the more difficult it will be to enforce. 
For example, Alaskan limited entry schemes do not allow temporary 
leasing of permits because of fear of absentee ownership. 10 reality, 
such arrangements do occur and enforcement is difficult. 
INDIVIDUAL FlSHERMAN QUOTAS ____ _ 
Initial allocation 
With a quota share system, initial allocation of privileges would 
have two parts: First, the criteria for inclusion would be developed; 
second, a procedure for distribution of shares among participants 
would be designed. Most quota share systems which have been 
proposed or implemented have set minimum requirements for 
eligibility, relying on the marketplace to redistribute the shares as 
the program progressed. The majority of appeals, therefore, have 
surrounded the "how much" decisions. Again, the more objective 
and mathematical the fonnula for allocation, the smaller the ad-
ministrative costs most likely will be. 
Monitoring and enforcement 
Difficulty or cost of enforcement is a commonJy cited drawback 
of quota share systems. Keeping track of an individual's accumulated 
reported landings and checking for possible violations would re-
quire some expansion of in-season data collection and processing 
efforts. The greater the number of ports, participants, gear types, 
and modes of distribution (processors, across the dock sales, etc.). 
the more complex the problem will be. For the groundfish fishery. 
many individuals land fish in more than one port during a year, 
requiring a timely coastwide vessel-specific data base. 
On the other hand, current regulations on rockfish trip limits re-
quire enforcement efforts similar to those that would be required 
for quota share systems. To enforce a 40,000 or 20,000 pound limit 
on individual fishing trips requires careful monitoring of the specific 
rockfish species landed in essentially all ground fish ports in Van-
couver, Columbia, and Eureka INPFC (IntI. N. Pac. Fish. Comm.) 
areas. Also, trip frequency limits (one rockfish trip per week or 
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one every two weeks) requires maintaining in-season records of 
each vessel's landing. Although an individual quota system would 
require an expanded in-season monitoring and record-keeping ac-
tivity, this would be a matter of degree, not a difference in kind 
of enforcement activity. 
One of the problems frequently associated with this fonn of limited 
access is the increased incentive for a fishennan to under-report 
his landings, since when landings equal individual quota, the fisher-
man's right to fish that species is terminated for that year. However, 
this incentive probably already exists under the current trip ton-
nage and frequency limits. A system of allowing for in-season and 
pennanent quota transfers would be essential to help minimize this 
problem. With the ability to buy additional shares of quota, a fisher-
man's fishing opportunities would be less constrained, although he 
would have the additional cost of these shares. Enforcement cover-
age and penalties for violation would need to be at a level which 
would act as an effective deterrent 10 under- or nonreporting. 
ADMINISTRATION OF IFQ PROGRAMS 
AROUND THE WORLD ________ _ 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Iceland currently have im-
plemented some fonn of IFQ program for selected fisheries. These 
include Canada's Nova Scotia/Bay of Fundy herring seine fishery, 
the offshore ground fish fishery. and the West Newfoundland trawl 
fishery; the Icelandic demersal fisheries and herring fishery; the 
Australian bluefin tuna fishery; and the New Zealand deepwater 
trawl fishery. New Zealand is extending its IFQ management 
(referred to as Individual Transferable Quotas, or ITQs) to all its 
inshore finfish fisheries as of October I, 1986. In the following 
section. the administration of these programs will be examined with 
respect to the issues raised above. 
Initial allocation 
It has been stressed that the more objective the formula for alloca-
tion utilized, the less likelihood that extensive appeal hearings will 
occur, thus lowering administrative costs. In the Australian bluefin 
tuna fishery an effort was made to make qualifying criteria as ob-
jective as possible. Out of 200 applications, 143 individuals qualified 
for quota shares. Many fishennen questioned the level of their initial 
allocations. Because the allocation fonnula was very clear, however, 
onJy two of the 70 appeals were granted (W. Robinson, Alaska Reg., 
Natl. Mar. Fish. Serv., NOAA, Juneau, pers. commun.). 
An alternative method is to not exclude any existing participant 
initially and allow reduction of effort to occur through transfer of 
quotas. This is essentially the route chosen by Iceland, New Zealand, 
and Canada. However, it does not preclude the need for hearing 
appeals on the level of quotas issued. For example, the initial alloca-
tion in the New Zealand finfish fisheries was based on catch histories 
from 1982-84. Fishennen were given the opportunity to contest the 
records of catch based on errors in statistics, changed fishing pat-
terns. or the effects of unavoidable crises. Due to 1,400 of the 1,800 
existing fishennen contesting their catch histories and to subsequent 
review by objections committees, implementation has been delayed 
over 8 months (Clark and Duncan 1986). 
Monitoring and enforcement 
One of the critical prerequisites for effective monitoring and en-
forcement of an IFQ system is industry support for the program. 
The more successful examples of IFQ programs, such as those in 
Iceland 's ground fish fishery , Australia ' s bluefin tuna fishery, and 
Canada's offshore groundfish fishery, resulted from extensive con-
sultations with industry and began with high levels of industry 
support. 
Several other factors influencing the effectiveness of monitoring 
and enforcement have been identified from observation of other 
countries' programs. These include the number of point of landings, 
number of landings , the amount of processing required. the market 
structure for the processed fish, the credibility of enforcement pro-
cedures to industry members, and the degree of social disruption 
involved. 
Number of points of landing-One of the less successful IFQ pro-
grams presently in place has been the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of St. 
Lawrence herring fishery program. In 1983, the Canadian govern-
ment instigated an IFQ program for these fisheries . One of the goals 
was to encourage a reduction in fleet size by making the IFQs freely 
transferable . Enforcement problems proved monumental during the 
first two years of the program. This was due, in part , to the nature 
of the transfer process between harvesters and processors. Some 
fishermen would offload onto another seiner which would act as 
a packer for several vessels. Ship-to-shore transfers usually took 
place by pumping fish from the holds to tanker trucks which would 
then deliver to the processors. Such transfers required minimal port 
facilities. Estimates put the actual landings during 1984 at 1.77 times 
that of the total quota . Little fleet reduction through consolidation 
of quotas took place during this time since there was little incen-
tive to pay for additional quota shares while enforcement was in-
effective . In addition, the level of cheating put the future of the 
program in doubt, further reducing the incentive to invest in quota 
shares (B. Muse , Comm. Fish. Entry Comm., Juneau, AK, pers. 
commun .). 
In 1985 a series of administrative steps was taken to address these 
problems. These included (I) a condition of license requiring a 
report of the quantity landed , area, and time of fishing; (2) a weekJy 
renewal of this condition of license; (3) authority to demand at time 
of landing a record of all fish caught, bought, and sold; (4) a re-
quirement that the captain of the vessel provide signed landing slips 
and log records ; and (5) annual licensing, including restrictions on 
gear and area of activity (Peacock and MacFarlane 1986) . Due to 
these actions, the Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans 
(DFO) estimates that actual landings now are approximately 1. 15 
times that of the formal total allowable catch , compared with 1.77 
times in 1984 (H . Scarth , Canada Dep. Fish. Oceans, Halifax, Nova 
Scotia , pers . commun .). 
Other substantial changes are considered necessary by DFO to 
fully counteract the severe enforcement and monitoring problems. 
These changes would require legislative action. First, landings 
would be required to be weighed using certified bins. This weigh-
in would be the responsibility of the processors, but DFO would 
conduct spot checks. Second, each skipper would be required to 
report by radio his estimated catch, time of arrival in port, and port 
of landing , and would have to acquire either written or verbal 
authorization for unloading. Making an unauthorized landing would 
be grounds for prosecution. DFO would also have the authority 
to designate ports of landing. 
In contrast, the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery invoives 
143 vessels , six or seven ports, four or five major processors, and 
some at-sea processing and marketing to foreign partners. Managers 
report that after observers were placed on board every at-sea 
processor, no significant enforcement problems occurred (W . 
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Robinson , Alaska Reg ., Natl. Mar. Fish. Serv. , NOAA , Juneau , 
pers . commun .) . 
Processed form and market structure-New Zealand managers 
are extremely optimistic about the extensive finfish IFQ program 
implemented in October 1986. Among the reasons for this optimism 
is the fact that the majority of the fish require additional process-
ing and then go to export markets. Consequently, monitoring con-
centrates on the flow of product through export market channels. 
Enforcement relies primarily on onshore monitoring mechanisms, 
although there are observers on vessels larger than 50 meters in 
length. All fish receivers must be licensed and must have a written 
record of the quantity of fish bought from each fisherman, a copy 
of which is forwarded to the regional governmental office. Fisher-
men also must send in their catch records to a regional office which 
enters the data on a computer network system linking the ports. 
The computer record of lTQs are updated weekly. The principal 
site of enforcement is the licensed fish receiver's office . A record 
of purchase must be held by the receiver for all fish . Lack of this 
record is cause for presumption of guilt and grounds for prosecu-
tion . A system of auditors maintains and monitors the recordkeeping 
on sales. About 70% of the inshore fleet catch goes through ap-
proximately 35 to 40 licensed fish receivers who are closely 
monitored on a regular basis. The landing of the remaining 30% 
is spot checked for compliance. New Zealand fishery managers feel 
that although it is useful to give the impression of 100% coverage. 
this is not cost effective, and it is only necessary to control 70 to 
80 % (I. Clark, Minist . Agric. Fish., Wellington, N .Z., pers . 
commun .) . 
Credibility of enforcement program-Programs which have ef-
fective landing control systems report few enforcement problems , 
particularly those systems in which noncompliance can result in 
stiff penalties, such as withdrawal of quota license. One such 
program is the Icelandic system, which has agents in each port to 
record landings, determine the volume of each species, and assess 
the quality (Amason 1986). Another problem cited in the Canadian 
herring fishery is that even when the enforcement personnel ap-
prehended a violator, the courts were reluctant to impose penalties 
at a level that would act as an effective deterrent (Peacock and 
MacFarlane 1986). 
Another crucial element in the enforcement of management 
measures is the acceptance of the regulations as "fair." The quota 
share system was strongly supported by the bluefin tuna fishermen 
from the start and , indeed, self-policing by the fleet did occur to 
some extent. If strong acceptance of a proposed program is not 
forthcoming, however, increased violations should be expected . 
ENFORCEMENT OF LIMITED 
ACCESS IN THE PACIFIC COAST 
GROUNDFISH FISHERY _______ _ 
To learn more about potential enforcement problems under either 
license limitation or IFQ programs in the ground fish fishery. the 
author questioned members of the Pacific Fishery Management 
Council ' s committee of enforcement consultants. Committee mem-
bers, who are enforcement agents with state and federal fisheries 
agencies, were asked to comment on three hypothetical examples 
of limited access programs. Three examples were used to make 
it easier for the enforcement consultants to visualize potential 
problems with the proposed regulatory tools. Without seeing some 
Table I-Hypothetical examples of limited access programs. 
Example I Trawl license limitation program 
-All trawl vessel owners qualify who have delivered at least 50 mt 
or 12 deliveries of groundfish in the year prior 10 implementation 
-Licenses valid coastwide 
- Licenses transferable 
-Trip limits and trip frequency regulations remain in effect 
Example 2 IFQs: Widow rockfish 
-Total coastwide quota of 9,300 mt divided into I-mt shares 
-Shares initially allocated to vessel owners on the basis of historical 
catch 
-Centralized computerized list of vessels with outstanding ,hares 
not landed, updated weekly 
-Shares transferable but transaction must be recorded before use 
-Trawl vessels only 
-Fish ticket availability the same as at present 
Example 3 IFQs: Widow rockfish, Sebasles, sablefish 
-Same as above except total quotas for sablefisb and Sebasles also 
divided into I-mt shares 
-All gear types landing> I mt will be allocated shares 
specifics of the program, it would be more difficult for the com-
mittee to provide realistic responses. The examples (as shown in 
Table 1) included one license limitation program similar to the 
FMA/CDA proposal (see Appendix A), one IFQ proposal for one 
species (widow rockfish) and one gear type (trawl), and one 
multigear multispecies IFQ proposal. It should be emphasized that 
these are hypothetical only. 
The enforcement consultants saw no major enforcement problems 
in the license limitation program outlined in Example 1. They em-
phasized that the permit should be onboard and the license should 
be displayed to facilitate at-sea monitoring. Because the fleet is 
mobile, the consultants thought the program should be coastwide. 
License limitation was viewed by the majority of the respondents 
as a useful enforcement too!. 
Comments concerning the two IFQ examples are summarized in 
Table 2. All of the enforcement experts felt the differences in dif-
ficulty and expense between enforcing multispecies and single-
species IFQs would not be great. However, the administrative 
burden of providing timely landing records would increase with 
larger numbers of species. Most of the consultants emphasized the 
need for accurate and timely by-vessel landings information, 
extensive enforcement monitoring, and stiff penalties for non-
compliance. One suggestion for minimizing the illegal landing of 
fish was to issue each share in the form of an official coupon to 
be relinquished at the time of landing or upon transfer of shares 
to another vessel. Requiring a declaration of landings at least 3 hours 
prior to arrival in port was suggested as a means to minimize the 
enforcement burden by allowing enforcement personnel to more 
closely track vessels. Noncompliance of this landing requirement 
would be viewed as great a violation as landing illegal quotas. 
Most of the enforcement agents were adamant that updated records 
of outstanding quotas be available at least on a semi-weekly and 
preferably a daily basis. Only one individual suggested that a weekly 
update would be acceptable, provided that detailed administrative 
documentation be maintained in order to prosecute offenders. A 
NOAA lawyer responsible for prosecuting fishery violations sug-
gested that prosecution not necessarily depend upon an enforce-
ment officer's presence at the time of the offense. Prosecution after 
the fact for violation of quotas is possible, given an adequate ac-
cumulation of data through fish ticket information, etc. This is 
similar to the current handling of violations of trip frequency 
regulations. 
According to the enforcement groups, the primary costs of im-
plementing an IFQ system similar to either of the examples given 
would be administrative costs related to maintaining an accurate, 
timely landing record. One of the greatest problems is data flow. 
Using the present system of reporting used to generate the PACFIN 
groundfish management data base, for example, it is doubtful that 
accurate accounts of landings by vessel could be maintained on a 
semiweekly, much less a daily, basis. 
Discussions with the data manager of the PACFIN system con-
cerning this problem yielded several alternatives which might allow 
a daily reporting system to be maintained. If the IFQ system was 
for a small number of species (see Example 2), a monitoring agent 
could call in a port's landings to a central computer entry person. 
Vessel name and license number, day of delivery, and pounds landed 
Table 2-Summary of comments by enforcement consultants on collection and dissemination of information necessary for effective enforcement of lFQ system. 
Item Information needed 
Status record of IFQ hOldings Report of each vessel should 
Declaration of landing 
Transfer of shares 
In-port monitoring 
include: 
name of vessel 
license number 
total lFQ by species 
landings to date 
date of last delivery 
Port of landing 
Estimated time of arrival 
Amount transferred 
Name and license of 
purchaser 
Name and license of previous 
owner 
Access to updated computer-
ized list 
On-site weighing of landing 
Agency/personnel 
State fish ticket personnel 
Central computer person 
Port agent 
Radio notification by skipper 
Transfer request recorded by 
central computer personnel 
Enforcement officer 
Seasonal aide with ready 
access to enforcement 
officer 
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Dissemination/timing 
Coastwide computer network 
Reports updated at least 
semiweekly 
Radio in at least 3 h before 
landing 
Record transfer '" I week 
before using shares 
Penalties 
Noncompliance grounds for 
prosecution 
Stiff penalties to provide 
sufficient deterrence, 
inclUding revocation of 
quota 
Table 3-Estimates of FY86 expenditures for west coast groundflsh resource conservation, manage-
ment and enforcement activities by agency (in thousands of dollars). (From R. McInnis et al. 
1986. Draft rep., Southwest Reg., Nail. Mar. Fish. Serv., NOAA, Terminal Island, CA 90731.) 
- - -
Management Direction. 
Resource and coordination, 
Agency assessment enforcement communication Total 
NMFS 
Northwest Region 
Northwest and Alaska Fisheries Center 
Southwest Region 
Sout hwest Fisheries Center 
Federal assistance to states 
Dingell-Johnson 
Coastwide data collection and analysis 
Pacific Fishery Management Council 
Pacific Marine Fisheries Commission 
States 
Washington 
Oregon 
California 
Total 
by species would be reported for each delivery. The main com-
puter system could then generate the report described in Table 2. 
Such a system would probably require one full-time data entry per-
son and one to two man-months to develop the software for the 
central system. Alternatively, if more gear types and species were 
involved, but a monitoring agent was still responsible for document-
ing landings, computer terminals could be installed in each port 
and the port sampler could transmit the landing records daily to 
the central system. Each computer hook-up would cost approximate-
ly $500 ($400 for the tenninal and $100 for a modem), and telephone 
charges would accrue on a regular basis. 
FUNDING AND 
GENERAL ADMINISTRATION ______ _ 
The substantial costs of administering a fishery management pro-
gram are spread among a wide variety of governmental entities and 
are subject to differing accounting systems. In conjunction with its 
groundfish planning efforts, the National Marine Fisheries Service, 
NOAA, recently estimated all expenditures by all governmental 
agencies for West Coast groundfish resource assessment, manage-
ment, enforcement, and other activities. The estimated expenditures 
for fiscal year 1986 are broken down into various entities as shown 
in Table 3. These estimates do not, of course, contain any expen-
ditures associated with administration of a license or share quota 
system. Implementation of a limited access program would require 
additional activities, but might permit reduction of some of the cur-
rent costs. 
License limitation 
Regardless of whether a license limitation system was implemented 
through state or federal authority, there would be some adminis-
trative costs associated with it. These costs would likely be highest 
at the start of the program when there would be the greatest number 
of appeals resulting from denial of initial applications. Funds for 
the program could come from state appropriations, federal funds, 
or through assessment of a license fee. The FMA/CDA moratorium 
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proposal (see Appendix A) suggests a $100 fee per vessel be levied 
to cover the cost of the industry-governing review board. 
In California's salmon troll limited entry program, a $35 annual 
fee is assessed to cover the costs of a five-member review board 
and salaries of two full-time staff members. At this point the pro-
gram is more than paying its way. 
As has been mentioned previously, any license limitation scheme 
for the ground fish fishery would need to be regional in nature, even 
if it were administered by the states. For consistency in hearing 
appeals, the review mechanism would most probably need to have 
members from each state. The Pacific Marine Fisheries Commis-
sion might be an appropriate organization to administer funds for 
such a review board. 
Quota share systems 
Initially, due to data processing capabilities, the costs associated 
with implementing a share system could be significant. However, 
if the quota share system could be implemented without severe 
enforcement problems, there should be less need in the long run 
for other forms of regulations necessary under a license limitation 
scheme to combat the effects of "overcapitalization creep." 
The program could be financed either with state and/or federal 
funds or by the participants themselves. If the latter course was 
chosen, a fee could be assessed either in the form of a landing 
tax or a transfer tax on the shares, or some combination of the 
two. 
Managers of several of the IFQ programs in other countries have 
estimated the cost of monitoring and enforcing their respective pro-
grams. The cost of administering the Nova Scotia/Bay of Fundy 
herring purse seine IFQ program was estimated to exceed $500 
thousand in 1985. The total landed value of the fishery was $18-20 
million (Peacock and MacFarlane 1986). Both Australia and New 
Zealand have adopted the position that users should pay a major 
part of the management cost. In Australia, a levy was introduced 
in 1985/86 for the northern prawn license limitation program and 
the southern bluefin tuna IFQ program. This levy was set to recover 
about $500 thousand or 38% of the estimated costs of managing 
these fisheries (Lilburn 1986). 
New Zealand fishery managers anticipate that the additional cost 
associated with initiating and administering the finfish ITQ pro-
gram will be as follows: 1985/86, $587,000; 1986/87 $1,127,000; 
and after 1987, $477,000 per year. It is anticipated that some user 
fees will be levied to cover at least part of the cost (1. Clark, Minist. 
Agric. Fish., Wellington, N.Z., pers. commun.). 
SUMMARY ____________ _ 
This chapter has examined administrative issues related to the initial 
allocation of privileges and the monitoring and enforcement of both 
license limitation and IFQ forms of limited access. Examples from 
existing programs in other countries were used to explore possible 
solutions to identified problems. 
With respect to allocation of privileges, the more objective the 
criteria for qualification , the less costly and time consuming will 
be the administration of initial allocation . Grandfathering in all re-
cent participants may be an administratively easy method of initial 
allocation , but it can cause a license limitation scheme to have an 
increased fleet capacity . This is theoretically less of a problem with 
an IFQ program, because some participants will buyout others to 
attain quotas which more closely utilize their capacity . In this way 
overall capacity is reduced . In the Australian bluefin tuna fishery, 
a 60% reduction in fleet capacity occurred within 6 months after 
the imposition of the ITQ system (Robinson 1986). 
Under a license limitation regime, an administrative mechanism 
such as a permit board must be set up to conduct an appeal hearing 
process and monitor other provisions such as minimal landing re-
quirements. Because of the regional nature of the groundfish fishery. 
such a board might need to be a multi-state operation. 
Particularly with an IFQ program, industry support is essential 
if the management regime is to be feasible. Monitoring and enforce-
ment will be easiest where the number of unloading ports is relatively 
small (such as with the west coast groundfish fishery), the primary 
markets are out of the local area, the final product requires some 
degree of processing, and the level of enforcement and associated 
penalties are great enough to lead participants to view the program 
as credible. 
Timely data and good administrative records are also extremely 
important for an effective IFQ program. New Zealand plans on rely-
ing heavily on an auditing system tracing the flow of fish through 
market channels to monitor the inshore finfish ITQ program. In 
addition, computer link-Ups to facilitate quota transfers and official 
recording of quota accounts will be employed. A quota coupon 
system was suggested by one of the PFMC (Pac. Fish. Manage. 
Counc.) enforcement consultants as a mechanism to keep track of 
quota deliveries and transfers. 
Some mechanism for transfer of quotas is essential in order to 
allow for maximum flexibility for the individual fisherman in plan-
ning his fishing operation while reducing the incentive for under-
reporting or discarding of catch. 
The cost of administering a license limitation program is most 
likely less than that of implementing an IFQ program. However, 
fewer additional measures such as trip frequency and trip tonnage 
limits would be necessary under an IFQ program. In addition , 
without restrictive entry requirements or a fleet capacity reduction 
program, the existing problem of excess capacity in the ground-
fish fleet would not be alleviated . 
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Whatever the structure of the limited entry program proposed, 
implementation is dependent upon the legal system for support . The 
degree of acceptance among participants win be reflected in fre-
quency of legal challenges and court tests, and the probable suc-
cess of such tests must be a serious concern in program design . 
These issues obviously extend into the areas of political and ad-
ministrative feasibility as well. The purpose of this chapter is to 
explore some of the legal questions of concern when considering 
alternative forms of efforts limitation . The discussion will focus 
primarily on license limitation and quota share concepts . 
Fishery-related license limitation programs during the past 30 
years have been subject to numerous legal challenges . There re-
mains little question that the concept of limited entry in general 
is legally regarded as a legitimate management tool. However, the 
specific characteristics of any given program must fan within cer-
tain constitutional and procedural constraints. 
MAGNUSON fiSHERY CONSERVATION 
AND MANAGEMENT ACT _______ _ 
The MFCMA specifically gave the regional councils authority to 
design and, through the Secretary of Commerce, to implement 
mechanisms for limiting access to a fishery in section 303(b)6 which 
states: 
" Any fishery management plan which is prepared by any coun-
cil, or by the secretary, with respect to any fishery, may ... (b) 
establish a system for limiting access to the fishery in order to 
achieve optimum yield, if, in developing such system, the Council 
and the Secretary take into account-
(A) present participation in the fishery, 
(B) historical fishing practices in, and dependence on, the fishery , 
(C) the economics of the fishery, 
(D) the capability of fishing vessels used in the fishery to engage 
in other fisheries, 
(E) the cultural and social framework relevant to the fishery, and 
(F) any other relevant considerations." 
To date, there have been only two federal programs approved: a 
moratorium under the Mid-Atlantic Council's surf clam and ocean 
quahog fishery management plan, and a troll salmon license limita-
tion program implemented through the North Pacific Council. 
Although both of these systems are based on license limitation, the 
Senate Report discussing Section 303 before its enactment (Senate 
Committee Rep. 94-416, 1975) lists quota share, taxes, and fees 
as limited access tools which might become useful upon refmement. 
While the report indicates an intent by Congress that design of such 
systems be allowed, it also suggests that limited entry be used 
carefully and, preferably, when other management techniques are 
inadequate. 
In a memorandum to the National Marine Fisheries Service Alaska 
region and the North Pacific Fisheries Management Council, pro-
viding a preliminary legal analysis of an individual quota system 
proposal, one of the NOAA regional attorneys suggested that the 
criteria listed in Section 303(b)6 must be taken into account but 
not necessarily accommodated in a limited access measure. He urged 
that the record of Council deliberation over any limited access 
system clearly show that the criteria were carefully considered and 
include the rationale for inclusion or exclusion. 
Any fishery management measures, including limited entry pro-
grams, must also comply with the National Standards set forth in 
Sec. 301(a) of the MFCMA. Standards 4 and 5, in particular, place 
substantive constraints on any limited entry proposal; the adminis-
trative record of decision must demonstrate that the proposed limited 
entry scheme meets these criteria or the scheme cannot be approved 
by the Secretary. 
National Standard 4 states that conservation and management 
measures shall not discriminate between residents of different states. 
If it becomes necessary to allocate or assign fishing privileges among 
various U.S. fishermen, such allocation shall be (A) fair and equi-
table to all such fishermen; (B) reasonably calculated to promote 
conservation; and (C) carried out in such a manner that no par-
ticular individual, corporation, or other entity acquires an excessive 
share of such privileges. 
National Standard 5 states that conservation and management 
measures shall, where practicable, promote efficiency in the utiliza-
tion of fishery resources; except that no sucl; measure shall have 
economic allocation as its sole purpose. 
GENERAL LEGAL CONCEPTS ______ _ 
Due process 
Maintenance of an extensive administrative record of the develop-
ment of a limited entry system is also important to demonstrate that 
the system meets the United States constitutional requirements of 
due process. The due process clause states that "no person ... shall 
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law ... 
While legal challenges to restrictions on occupational access as an 
infringement on personal liberty have generally been unsuccessful, 
it is necessary that the rationale behind the limitation be clearly and 
rationally related to the objective for the action, in this case fisheries 
management. [See Corsa v. Tawes, 149 F. Supp. 771 (D. Md.), 
a'ffd, 355 U.S.C. Sec. 34 (1957), upholding a Maryland statute 
which prohibited the harvest of menhaden by purse seines, finding 
that the legislative means chosen were rationally related to the ob-
jective of protecting the recreational fisheries.] 
The due process clause also requires that procedural safeguards 
be afforded to those whose rights are affected by the limited entry 
scheme. The procedures are required to prevent arbitrary govern-
ment actions and to ensure that fair and accurate decisions are 
rendered when liberty or property interests are involved. Due pro-
cess is a flexible concept and the degree of procedural protection 
required may vary depending on the nature of the private interest 
involved, on the risk of an erroneous decision under the procedures 
used compared with the value of additional procedures, and on the 
government interest in avoiding unnecessary, costly, and burden-
some procedures. 
While it is impossible to state what procedures are required in 
the absence of a concrete proposal, several generalizations can be 
made. Where existing rights are not affected, i.e., existing 
participants are "grandfathered in," there would not be a due 
process problem. However, greater procedural protections would 
be required when existing rights are affected rather than 
"grandfathered;" for example, by an entry proposal that either 
eliminates existing excess effort capacity or contemplates revoca-
tion or modification of entry permits. Less procedural protection 
would be required for decisions on new entrants, since the new 
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entrant's interest is more speculative than that of existing license 
holders. 
Prior notice and formal trial type hearings are generally required 
where important interests are involved, if the decision turns on in-
dividualized questions of fact. Examples are entry qualifications 
based on past dependence on the fishery, hardship exemptions, or 
the types of questions involved in a license revocation for fishery 
violations. The hearing must precede the license deprivation unless 
a compelling public interest in delaying the hearing can be shown. 
Sufficiently compelling reasons are uncommon. 
More informal procedures are allowed if the decision is based 
on objective, mechanically applied standards, such as entry qualifica-
tions based on years of experience or years of participation in the 
fishery. The more objective the criteria, the greater the chance that 
summary procedures will be acceptable, since objectivity enhances 
the accuracy of the decision, making more formal procedures un-
necessary. The criteria must, however, still be rationally related 
to the objective sought; oversimplification may increase the risk 
of the criteria being found an irrational means to the legitimate end 
of fishery management. 
Due process also requires the decision to be fair. Generally this 
means the decision-maker must be free from conflicts of interest 
or bias towards the party involved. In most cases a generalized in-
terest. such as being a member of the regulated group, does not 
create a conflict, while a specific personal interest, such as direct 
monetary interest in the outcome, will violate due process. State 
and federal laws differ somewhat on what constitutes fair procedure, 
with many states having stricter standards (e.g., Washington re-
quires that in addition to actual fairness, the hearing must also ap-
pear to be fair). These differences must be taken into account if 
state, rather than federal, programs are chosen. 
Equal protection 
The 14th amendment to the Constitution states that "No state shall 
make or enforce any law which shall ... deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. " Accordingly, any 
state or federal limited entry program must pass a "rational basis" 
test to comply with equal protection criteria. That is, the classifica-
tions for allocation must be rationally related to the statutory pur-
poses of fishery management and must treat all individuals within 
any given classification equally. Again, although limited entry pro-
grams will most likely be evaluated against a fairly lenient rationality 
test, the greater the care taken to make clear the relationship be-
tween the fishery management objectives and the means to reach 
that objective, the greater the likelihood that the court will uphold 
the management measures. 
Discrimination between residents 
Whether effort limitation legislation is implemented on an individual 
state basis or regionally by an amendment to a federal fishery 
management plan, care must be taken that provisions do not 
discriminate between residents of different states. The privileges 
and immunities clause and the commerce clause provide the con-
stitutional basis of this requirement (Koch 1985). These provisions 
require that there be no undue discrimination against nonresidents 
and that excessive burden on interstate commerce not be tolerated. 
As indicated above, with respect to implementation of a federal 
limited access scheme in the 3-200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic 
Zone, the MFCMA also prohibits discrimination between residents 
of different states (Sec. 301[a]4). 
The "taking" question 
In addition to the due process clause, the fifth amendment also states 
•• . . . nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. " The issue of whether a share quota system of limited 
access creates property rights which , if altered, would have to be 
compensated is controversial and deserves additional legal analysis. 
Careful drafting of limited entry provisions would likely avoid this 
problem by providing advance notice that shares are subject to 
modification based on legitimate management needs. Termination 
of shares presents a more direct question , and comper.sability would 
depend on the reasons for termination and the type of share system 
involved. For example, non-renewal of a temporary certificate 
would probably not require compensation, but revocation of a per-
manent certificate without cause might be compensible. 
Fleet capacity reduction programs 
Frequently the number of vessels initially eligible under a limited 
access program is greater than the optimum fleet size. One mech-
anism utilized to subsequently reduce the fleet capacity is a vessel 
or license buy-back system. When a buy-back program was being 
designed for the northwest salmon fishery, additional implement-
ing legislation (the Salmon and . Steel head Conservation and 
Enhancement Act) was passed . The MFCMA does not explicitly 
provide for the implementation and financing of a buy-back pro-
gram in conjunction with a limited access program at this time . 
Other applicable law 
For a federal limited entry system to be implemented through the 
plan amendment process, compliance is required with other ap-
plicable legislation such as the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA); 
Executive Order 12291 (E.O. 12291); the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA); the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA); 
the Administrative Procedures Act (APA); the Endangered Species 
Act (ESA); and the Marine Manunal Protection Act (MMPA). 
The RFA requires that an analysis of the impacts on small business 
of any proposed regulation be made which includes a rationale for 
the proposed regulation, an estimate of the number and type of small 
entities which will be affected, an assessment of the costs imposed 
on these small businesses, and a discussion of alternatives to the 
proposed rule which could achieve the same objectives. 
E.O. 12291 requires that the limited entry program will help 
achieve the maximum net benefits to society from the resource and 
that the least burdensome regulations to achieve such benefits will 
be imposed. 
NEPA requires all federal agencies to assess the environmental 
impacts of their activities. An environmental impact statement (EIS) 
must be prepared for all major actions with potential significant 
impacts on the environment. An amendment to a Fishery Manage-
ment Plan (FMP) imposing a limited entry system would require 
an environmental assessment and probably an EIS . An EIS must 
discuss the environmental impacts of the proposed actions and must 
explore possible alternatives, assessing the impacts of each alter-
native as well. Since the process is intended to promote environmen-
tally sound decision-making, preparation of a draft statement should 
be done as early as possible for use in decision-making . The state-
ment must be circulated for conunent to other federal and state 
agencies as well as to the public. After consideration of the com-
ments, a final statement must be issued before any action is taken. 
Failure to comply with NEPA procedures could result in suspen-
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sion of the action pending NEPA compliance . Most states have their 
own versions of NEPA which must be complied with if a limited 
entry program is implemented through the states . 
The CZMA was enacted to encourage coastal states to formulate 
coastal zone management plans to establish general land - and water-
use policies and goals which are implemented on a local level. Once 
the plans are in place and approved by the Secretary of Conunerce, 
federal activities directly affecting the coastal zone must be con-
sistent to the maximum extent practicable with the state plans. A 
"consistency determination" must be prepared , identifying the 
direct effects contemplated and describing how the activity has been 
tailored to achieve consistency. State-implemented limited entry pro-
grams must also comply with applicable state coastal zone policies. 
The APA provisions on notice and comment rulemaking are in-
corporated into the MFCMA at Secs . 304 and 305. Any federal 
limited entry regulations must be preceded by a notice of proposed 
rulemaking published in the Federal Register and an opportunity 
for public conunent on the proposed rules . FoHowing considera-
tion of the comments , the final rules must be published along with 
a concise general statement of their basis and purpose at least 30 
days before they take effect. Unless notice and comment require-
ments are waived for good cause , rules enacted in violation of the 
APA are invalid. 
The APA provisions on formal adjudication are incorporated into 
the MFCMA at Sec . 308. Any civil p.:nalty proceeding for viola-
tions of MFCMA regulations, including limited entry regulations, 
requires notice of the proceeding and opportunity for a trial-type 
hearing before the penalty can be imposed. Most states have APAs 
which would impose similar requirements on state-implemented 
limited entry programs. 
The ESA prohibits federal actions which would jeopardize the 
continued existence of endangered or threatened species or the 
degradation of their critical habitats. The EIS accompanying the 
program must assess its impact on endangered or threatened species. 
Again, states may have similar or more restrictive laws with which 
state-implemented programs must comply . 
The MMPA creates a general moratorium on the taking of marine 
manunals. There is an exception to acconunodate the incidental catch 
of some marine mammals in commercial fishing (50 C.F.R. Sec. 
216.24). Any limited entry proposal must comply with the general 
moratorium, the limited regulatory exceptions relating to inciden-
tal catches under general permits, and the certificate of inclusion 
in the permit for each commercial fishing vessel. 
If the record on which the access system is based does not 
demonstrate that the requirements of these statutes are fulfilled, the 
limited access measure will be denied . An example was the rejec-
tion by the Office of Management and Budget (OM B) of the North 
Pacific Fishery Management Council's approved moratorium for 
the halibut fishery. The reasons cited for denial in a letter from 
OMB to John Byrne, Administrator of NOAA, include inconsistency 
with E.O. 12291 and a concern that the moratorium would prevent 
consideration of long-term solutions such as the share system. 
IMPLEMENTING AUTHORIZING 
LEGISLATION ___________ _ 
Regardless of whether state or federal legislation is sought, the road 
toward implementation will be relatively arduous and, without 
substantial industry support and active involvement, impossible to 
pass. A federal system might be preferred due to the regional nature 
of the groundfish fishery and the need for coastwide consistent 
regulations and information. On the other hand, existing limited 
entry programs are state administered, and the infrastructure needed 
to conduct these programs is already in place on a state level. In 
addition, the states have been reluctant to relinquish such authority 
to the federal government in the past (i.e., when the Pacific Fishery 
Management Council was considering a regional troll salmon mora-
torium). Whichever path is chosen, should the decision to pursue 
limited entry be made, certain procedural steps must be followed. 
In the sections below are outlined the procedural steps which must 
be followed. 
Federal 
Imposition of a federal limited entry program would require a 
ground fish plan amendment. The entire process is approximately 
a 15-18 month task. If a large amount of controversy and changes 
occurred as a result of the public hearing, the time needed for im-
plementation would be extended. 
At this time, the MFCMA does not explicitly allow for a buy-
back program. If such an effort-reduction measure was desired, 
it might require additional legislation by Congress. 
State 
In order to have a regional license implemented through state legisla-
tion, all three pieces of authorizing legislation would need to be 
substantively identical. As the Fisheries Marketing Association 
discovered during the 1985 legislative session, obtaining similar 
legislation from three different state legislatures is a time-consuming 
process requiring a large amount of coordination. One mechanism 
to make this task more feasible is the recently-formed Pacific 
Fisheries Legislative Task Force composed of two state senators 
and representatives each from Washington, Oregon, California, and 
Alaska. 
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SUMMARY ____________ _ 
This chapter explored the legal mandates and concepts which must 
be taken into account when designing any limited access system. 
The MFCMA gives the regional councils the authority to design 
mechanisms to limit access to fisheries under Sec. 303(b)6, but it 
lays out specific criteria which must be taken into account. In 
addition, National Standards 4 and 5 can place substantive con-
straints on any limited entry proposal and the record must show 
that these standards are specifically met. 
Constitutional requirements which must be adhered to include 
the right to due process, the right to equal protection, and the pro-
vision that no undue discrimination against residents of different 
states occurs or excessive burden is placed on interstate commerce. 
It is essential that the administrative records show that these re-
quirements were considered during the design and implementation 
of the program. If IFQs are considered a property right and the 
level of quotas is reduced, the portion of the fifth amendment which 
disallows the taking of private property might also have to be ad-
dressed. Careful drafting of limited entry provisions would likely 
avoid any problem by providing advance notice that shares are sub-
ject to modification based on legitimate management needs. In 
addition, any federal management measures implementing limited 
entry would have to show compliance with other applicable laws, 
as is required of all amendments to Fishery Management Plans. 
Authorizing legislation for ground fish effort limitation programs 
could be sought either federally through the Council system or by 
coordinated state legislation. Due to the regional nature of the 
ground fish fishery and the need for a coastwide consistent program, 
a federal program implemented through plan amendment might be 
desired. On the other hand, existing limited entry programs are state 
administered. In the past, the states have been reluctant to relin-
quish such authority to the federal government. 
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The seven main chapters of this report cover the following topics: 
(I) the concept of limited access; (2) rationale for considering 
limiting access in fisheries generally and in Pacific coast ground-
fish specifically; (3) the broad range of alternative forms of limited 
access available; (4) trade-offs between limited access and other 
forms of fishery regulation; (5) potential economic benefits; (6) en-
forcement and administrative considerations; and (7) legal issues 
and requirements. The Citations section contains most of the exist-
ing literature concerned with development and implementation of 
limited access in fisheries . Appendix A reproduces the trawl license 
system proposed in 1984 by the Fishermen's Marketing Associa-
tion and Coast Draggers Association . Those readers requiring a 
brief overview of the content of this report may benefit from the 
following summary and this author's brief perspectives on the study 
effort. 
SUMMARY OF 
PREVIOUSCHAPTERS ________________ _ 
Concepts of limited access 
To effectively conserve fish stocks, all forms of fishery regulation 
must control fishing effort and fishing mortality by modifying the 
conditions under which fishermen are allowed access to the fish. 
Common fishery regulations , such as annual quotas , size limits , 
gear restrictions, and area closures, control fishing effort by reduc-
ing the catching power of fishing gear or the time and area over 
which fishing is permitted. Limited access may also be used to 
reduce fishing effort, although it differs from traditional regula-
tions by restricting fishing privileges to specific individuals or firms. 
In other words, a limited access system (1) identifies who is per-
mitted to harvest fish and (2) specifically controls the number of 
permittees . 
Both license limitation and individual fishermen quotas (IFQs), 
the most common forms of limited access , involve an initial alloca-
tion of fishing privileges which subsequently restrains the level of 
participation in a fishery. With license limitation the fishermen, 
vessel owners, or firms assigned fishing rights are not explicitly 
limited to any given quantity of harvest. An IFQ system assigns 
quantitative harvest rights to individuals . These harvest rights may 
be fixed for long periods or annually recomputed as a share of the 
fishery quota . Both licenses and IFQs may be tied to the initial 
licensee or may be transferable at the discretion of the owner. A 
limited access system may be used in combination with or instead 
of traditional fishery regulations. 
Rationale for limiting access 
A wide range of objectives may be addressed through limited access. 
Nine main objectives, discussed in Chapter 2, are to (I) promote 
economic efficiency in harvesting, (2) establish secure tenure in 
the fishery for fishermen, (3) enhance the value of fishery products, 
(4) increase and stabilize profitability in the fishing fleet, (5) reduce 
the burden of regulations on the fishery, (6) reduce the costs of 
fisheries management, (7) secure an equitable division of benefits 
from the fishery, (8) protect various segments of the fishery from 
other fishermen and noncommercial interests, and (9) help restrain 
fishing effort to conserve fish stocks. Clearly, not all limited ac-
cess programs can or will accomplish all these objectives. Also, 
most of these objectives can be addressed by other kinds of regula-
tions. The reason for considering limited access as a major part 
of the fishery management program is that it uniquely addresses 
the widespread problem of overcapitalization and economic ineffi-
ciency in fishing. 
In contrast to most private property resources. common property 
fish stocks are not adequately conserved under competitive frec 
enterprise. With open access to fish stocks. fishing firms have linle 
control over total harvests in the fishery. and they have no assurance 
that conservation actions involving private short-term sacrifice will 
result in benefits to them in the longer term. The failure of private 
economic self-interest to assure biological conservation is clearly 
the principal reason that traditional fishery management is initiated. 
While annual quotas, season closures. and gear restrictions may 
prove adequate to reduce fishing mortality and maintain fish popula-
tions, these traditional regulations do not restrain the incentives to 
"race for fish" by expanding fishing capacity. 
By requiring that a new entrant to the fishery obtain either a license 
or an IFQ, a limited access system will prevent new vessels from 
rapidly expanding a fishing fleet, and may reduce the incentives 
for existing fishermen to expand fishing capacity beyond that 
justified by economic considerations. The degree to which this oc-
curs under limited access to a fishery depends upon the specific 
circumstances. Generally, IFQ-type systems are expected to per-
form bener than license limitation in encouraging private harvesters 
to eliminate excessive investment in fishing capacity. 
Because limiting access does not remove reasons for public par-
ticipation in fishery regulation, government agencies and interested 
public groups will continue to be active in managment. All forms 
of public regulation are costly in agency budgets and in time spent 
on decision-making by official commissions, by industry represen-
tatives, and by the general public. Whether limited access is justifi-
able in a particular circumstance depends partly upon whether the 
economic returns in fishing can be improved sufficiently to justify 
the management costs. If a particular industry does not exhibit ex-
cessive investment, economic inefficiency or instability due to free 
access, then the cost of establishing limited access would not be 
justified by potential economic benefit. 
As noted in Chapter 2, the Pacific groundfish fishery exhibits 
some of the economic maladies that limited access could address. 
Rapid growth of the fishery during 1976-82 was followed by a short 
period of severe economic stress. Overbuilding of the trawl fleet, 
collapse of the pink shrimp fishery, reduced market prices, and 
declining annual yield of rockfish species all conspired to cause 
a significant exit of vessels via bankruptcy and migration to other 
fisheries. The economic status of the fishing fleet has improved since 
1984, but a repeat of that economic strife is a clear possibility. 
Whether limited access can remedy these economic problems with-
out introducing new problems of equal concern is a central issue 
in the discussion of limited access. 
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Alternative limited access systems 
Chapter 3 contains an extensive introduction to the elements of 
limited access programs. Each element is explained by reference 
to the trawl license moratorium proposal by the Fisherman's 
Marketing Association and Coast Draggers Association and to other 
alternatives from the literature on limited entry. The discussion 
shows that a very wide range of options is available for developing 
a program tailored to the particular needs and situation of a fishery. 
The options are organized into the following seven categories: 
(1) scope of the fishing activity to be restricted: 
(2) method of limited access (licenses or IFQs); 
(3) initial allocation of harvest rights: 
(4) transferability of harvest rights: 
(5) longevity of harvest rights; 
(6) mechanisms for adjusting the number of licenses; and 
(7) handling disputes regarding issuance and transfer of rights. 
The range of alternatives under each category is briefly suggested 
by the examples listed below. 
The scope of a limited access program could be based upon a 
biological stock or group of stocks, a logical geographic range, a 
particular gear type. or combination of these factors. The means 
of limiting access are (a) license limitation, (b) individual fishermen 
quotas, and (c) taxes or royalties on catch. Although use of royalties 
on fish catch has been widely discussed in academic circles, this 
is considered an impractical way to introduce limited access in 
groundfish, based upon fairness and administrative feasibility. Im-
position of royalties would inunediately reduce incomes of fishermen 
who are generally just breaking even under open access competi-
tion. and would drive many out of business without compensation. 
Also. since the proper royalty should reflect the economic value 
of conserving fish stocks, it should vary substantially over time. 
Under existing legislative rules. this would be difficult to accom-
plish. Consequently, the discussion focuses only on license limita-
tion and lFQ options. 
Licenses may be assigned to individual fishermen, to vessel 
owners, to fish processing firms, or to other entities. These same 
options apply to licenses with a quantitative share attached (IFQ). 
The quantity may be fixed in perpetuity, or it may be adjusted 
annually based upon the status of the fish stocks, or it may be ad-
justed based upon the owner's past performance. All of these various 
definitions and restrictions on the nature of the fishing right have 
been suggested or tried in actual limited access systems. 
Licenses or IFQs could be allocated to all past participants, to 
only those past participants meeting some minimum landing require-
ment, to all those paying a given fee, to the highest bidders in an 
auction, or to the winners of a lonery. Initial allocation tends to 
be more troublesome in a fully developed rather than a newly 
developing fishery. Past users do not have legal rights to the public 
fish stocks, but they must be dealt with in a clearly even-handed 
and rational manner. Almost all license limitation programs have 
started by "grandfathering in" all those having evidence of past 
participation. In the few examples of license limitations being im-
plemented at the start of a fishery, the initial allocation has been 
based upon objective qualifications or "first-come, first-served." 
Transferability tends to be a heated and sometimes divisive issue. 
Nontransferable licenses are generally extinguished when the owner 
leaves the fishery; the state may reissue the license to a qualified 
new fisherman. Transferable licenses are normally restricted to par-
ticular gear types (e.g., a power troll license cannot be used to 
operate a purse seiner), and are often limited to vessels of equivalent 
fishing capacity. Some licenses are attached to vessels and can be 
transferred only with sale of the vessel. Most economists, and many 
participants in established license limitation programs, insist that 
limited harvest rights should be saleable at the discretion of the 
owners. Voluntary exchange between competent individuals is 
assumed to be as rational a form of reallocation as is likely to oc-
cur. The most frequent counter-argument contends that market 
prices of transferable licenses represent an unearned and unjustifiable 
windfall to the original owner, and that the purchase of a license 
becomes a barrier to entry of new fishermen. 
Licenses and IFQs may be good for a single year, for several 
years, or in perpetuity. Because limited access systems are generally 
adopted to provide stability and secure tenure for fishermen, most 
license systems have perpetual licenses. To reduce the number of 
outstanding harvest rights, therefore, requires that the number of 
owners be reduced through attrition, administrative revocation, or 
repurchase. Attrition would work only for nontransferable pennits, 
and revocation generally requires due process and sufficient cause. 
Neither of these processes can be controlled to achieve a target 
fishing capacity. Where a reduction in fleet size or fishing capa-
city is desired, existing licenses can be bought by public agencies, 
a process normally called "buy-back. " Where an increase in number 
of licenses is desired, new participants can be selected by lottery, 
by "first-come, first-served," by sale at a posted price, by auc-
tion, or by lottery. 
Disputes can be expected to arise from the initial distribution of 
fishing rights, from the transferal of rights, and from the revoca-
tion of rights for cause. Well-known dispute settlement procedures 
are available for limited access systems. These include state and 
federal courts, administrative law judges, special appeals or review 
boards, and agency administrative decisions. The important point 
is to anticipate disputes over licensing and to establish a legal pro-
cedure in advance with the hope that administrative costs of deal-
ing with disputes will be reduced. 
Limited access and other fishery regulations 
To achieve a reduction in either the burden of regulations or ad-
ministrative and enforcement costs, a limited access program must 
make it possible to reduce other regulations or to reduce the monitor-
ing and enforcement effort. In Chapter 5, Wes Silverthorne and 
Susan Hanna review regulations pertaining to the Pacific ground-
fish fishery in 1986, and draw upon experience in five existing 
limitation programs to anticipate what regulations might be removed 
or simplified under limited access. Existing regulations include 
quotas and harvest guidelines intended to control overall fishing 
mortality; limits on catch per trip (called "trip limits") intended 
to lengthen the season on rockfish; incidental catch trip limits in-
tended to control discards of incidentally caught sablefish and Pacific 
ocean perch; minimum cod-end mesh size restrictions intended to 
adjust size-at-capture, and other restrictions on trawl gear to make 
the mesh size regulations effective; and measures to avoid gear con-
flict (e.g., marking requirements on fixed gear). 
The literature regarding license limitation programs combined 
with past experience in Australia, Japan, British Columbia, and 
Alaska lead the authors to conclude that license limitation is unlikely 
to provide much relief from the existing regulations. Both economic 
theory and experience show that limiting the number of fishing 
operations does not directly limit fishing effort. This is especially 
true when all past participants in the fishery are "grandfathered" 
into the license system. Licensed fishermen will expand the fishing 
capacity of the existing fleet when there are economic incentives 
to do so. But fishing effort must be limited in order to control fishing 
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mortality and conserve fish stocks. Consequently, a license limita-
tion system in Pacific coast ground fish is not expected to alleviate 
the need for effort-controlling regulations such as annual quotas 
and trip limits. 
In contrast to limited licenses, IFQs will act to limit the amount 
of fish landed. The establishment of an IFQ system should have 
a direct bearing on the use of closed fishing seasons to enforce quotas 
and on the use of trip limits to lengthen the fishing season. Because 
they limit only the landings of individual participants. the IFQs can-
not address management objectives related to gear conflicts, fish 
size, or discards. Thus an IFQ system promises to reduce the need 
for certain regulations, but leaves untouched the need for regula-
tions designed to control aspects of the fishery unrelated to quan-
tities of fish landed. In general, the IFQ alternative is more likely 
to reduce the need for other regulations than the license limitation 
alternative. 
A crucial consideration is the amount of fish discarded by com-
mercial fishermen under an IFQ system. Current efforts to reduce 
the discard of incidentally caught fish are reflected in small trip 
limits that are imposed during the season after most of the quota 
has been landed. In 1985, for example, trawlers were limited to 
3,000 pounds of sablefish per trip after 90% of the annual quota 
was reached. This species of fish would still be discarded if the 
fisherman does not have a market for the fish and if the incidental 
catch exceeds the allowable level after the incidental trip limit is 
imposed. IFQs may cause an increased incidence of discards. Clear-
ly, when a fisherman has no more IFQ left for sablefish, he wi.11 
not land even the incidental catch allowance. Thus it may be 
desirable to either continue incidental allowances after IFQs are 
exhausted or to assure that an active market for IFQs provides an 
opportunity for fishermen to land the fish that they catch. If the 
IFQ market is successful, incidental catch regulations may become 
unnecessary . 
Potential economic benefits 
Because economic benefits associated with increased efficiency in 
harvesting under limited access are expected, the estimated economic 
benefit calculated in Chapter 5 is an important consideration. The 
linear programming model reported in that chapter determines what 
fishing effort level and pattern of deployment among alternative 
modes by the trawl fleet will maximize the fleetwide profit. The 
model combines the best data available on fishing costs and prices 
with estimated catch rates derived from fish landings information. 
The profit for the fleet is simply defined as the sum of quantity 
caught times price in each species category minus the operating 
and fixed costs for the fleet. It is assumed that the fleet is restricted 
to taking no more than the acceptable biological catches and/or max-
imum sustainable yields reported by the Groundfish Management 
Team in 1985. 
Given that the joint venture Pacific whiting fishery remains at 
about its level in 1984 and that the pink shrimp trawl fishery con-
tinues at a level equal to a recent 12-year average, the calculation 
shows that the fleet could earn an overall profit of about $12 million. 
This represents the total profit that might be attained by a hypothe-
tical central manager who chooses a fleet composed of just the right 
size composition of trawl vessels and who operates a trawl fleet 
strictly for profit. The optimum fleet so defined would be about 
38 % smaller than the trawl fleet operating in 1984. If the manager 
were allowed only to reduce the total size of the fleet from the 1984 
level without changing the size composition, the maximum profit 
would be $7 million and the optimum fleet would be 40% smaller 
than in 1984. A rough estimate of potential profit from efficiently 
managing the non-trawl fleet would give another $0.6 million. 
Estimated economic profit is an important consideration because 
it tells what might be earned to offset any administrative and en-
forcement costs associated with a limited access system. However, 
the estimates presented in Chapter 5 should not be viewed as 
economic benefits that necessarily result from limited access. The 
$12 million trawl fleet profit represents a best guess regarding max-
imum profit under ideal circumstances. These ideal circumstances 
could not be replicated by a license limitation system of any kind, 
especially one that "grandfathers in" all existing trawl vessel 
operators. Limiting the number of participants in the fishery will 
place a rough upper limit on fishing capacity, but it will not remove 
the economic incentives of individual operators which result in 
"capital stuffing" associated with the competitive race for fish. With 
IFQ management, the individual operator's profit incentives would 
focus more on cost minimization than on catch maximization. 
Hence, more overall fleet profit should be possible with IFQs. Other 
complications, such as discards of incidental catches, may still be 
a barrier to ideally efficient operation. Consequently, the profit 
generated by a fleet under limited access may approach, but would 
likely fall short of, the maximum possible. 
Enforcement and administrative issues 
In Chapter 6 Dorothy Lowman summarizes the major enforcement 
and administrative problems that are likely to arise under license 
limitation or IFQ systems. She also reviews the world experience 
with IFQ systems, providing some guidance on what conditions 
make enforcement and administration more or less difficult, and 
reports on an effort to determine what would be required to imple-
ment limited access in the Pacific groundfish fishery. With regard 
to license limitation, the main requirements are for maintenance 
and frequent updating of records on license ownership and for an 
appeals mechanism to handle disputes on initial allocation and any 
subsequent license revocations. To limit the administrative effort 
in settling appeals of initial allocations, the criteria for inclusion 
or exclusion should be as objective and specific as possible. It would 
be advisable to avoid, for example, a vague criteria crediting fisher-
men for past participation during years they did not fish due to 
"unavoidable circumstances" (from Alaska's first limited entry 
regulation). 
Enforcement and administration of license limitation for Pacific 
ground fish would be relatively simple and inexpensive because it 
would involve only a slight extension of existing licensing efforts. 
All commercial fishermen are already licensed and vessel owners 
are required to display their commercial vessel registration numbers. 
To enforce a license limitation for groundfish, enforcement agents 
suggest the requirement that permits be carried and openly displayed 
onboard vessels to facilitate at-sea monitoring. The moderate cost 
of maintaining updated records of license transfers and operating 
an appeals board for a license limitation program might be covered 
by a $100 per year fee as suggested in the proposal from the Fisher-
men's Marketing Association. 
Administration and enforcement of IFQs would be a more dif-
ficult undertaking. Based upon experience elsewhere, the initial 
allocation of quotas would most likely mimic past harvest shares, 
and actual landings of each licensed vessel would have to be 
monitored for quantity and species composition. This would require 
better recordkeeping than that needed to establish the simple fact 
of past participation. The quantities determined by the agency would 
open another avenue for appeals. In both New Zealand groundfish 
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and Australian bluefin tuna, a substantial number of fishermen did 
appeal their initial allocation of quota shares. Again, the more ob-
jective and specific the criteria used to determine quantitative shares, 
the less administrative effort wilJ be required to start-up the program. 
Enforcement may be the •• Achilles heel" of the IFQ system. Dur-
ing the fishing season, each vessel's landings of each species covered 
by the quota system will need to be recorded and monitored. The 
difficulty of accomplishing this at reasonable cost will depend upon 
the (1) number of unloading points used by the fleet; (2) number 
of individual landings made by vessels; (3) amount of processing 
required to produce the final product; (4) market structure of the 
processed fish; (5) credibility of the enforcement program; and (6) 
degree of social disruption caused by the IFQ program. Based on 
a review of world experience with IFQ systems, Dorothy Lowman 
notes that with fewer ports involved and with less frequent 
deliveries, the enforcement of landings quotas would be simpler 
and easier. Where the fish go through an extensive processing chain 
(e.g., frozen fish fillets versus fresh salmon) and where the market-
ing chain is concentrated in the hands of a few firms or goes through 
a central inspection process (e.g., New Zealand groundfish), 
monitoring of actual landings is made easier and more credible. 
To minimize the illegal landing of fish, the enforcement agents 
contacted during the study suggested that an official coupon be issued 
for each quota share, and that these coupons be relinquished at the 
time of landing or upon transfer of the shares to another vessel. 
Other suggestions included a declaration of intended landing 3 hours 
prior to arrival in port, and the levying of stiff penalties for non-
compliance. Most enforcement agents also insisted that records of 
vessel landings under an IFQ system would need to be available 
on a weekly or semiweekly basis. While this would be a new burden 
on the data collection and reporting system, it is probably feasible 
to overcome the data flow problems by placing port agents on a 
computer hook-up. 
Legal issues and requirements 
Chapter 7 contains Dorothy Lowman's review of legal mandates 
and concepts that need to be taken into consideration in designing 
a limited access system. The Magnuson Fisheries Conservation and 
Management Act permits regional fIShery councils to include limited 
access measures in their fishery management plans if they satisfy 
certain criteria. The councils must take into account, for example, 
present participation in the fishery, historical fishing practices in 
and dependence on the fishery, economics of the fishery, and the 
cultural and social framework relevant to the fishery. How these 
factors are to be taken into account is not laid out in detail. The 
two federal programs approved so far (a moratorium on the Mid-
Atlantic Council's surf clam and ocean quahog fishery and a troll 
salmon license limitation program implemented by the North Pacific 
Council) demonstrate the feasibility of meeting the criteria. It is 
necessary that a Council's record of deliberations show that the 
criteria were considered. 
Constitutional requirements are also important. The limited ac-
cess system must recognize the right of due process, the right to 
equal protection, the provision that no undue discrimination occur 
between residents of different states, and that no excessive burden 
be placed upon interstate commerce. Again, the administrative 
record needs to show that these requirements were recognized and 
considered in implementing the program. Another issue is the taking 
of property without just compensation. Under an IFQ system, the 
management council may wish to decrease total harvests by reducing 
the individual's allotted quantitative harvest share. Careful legal 
analysis needs to be applied to assure that a proposed IFQ does 
not create a property right which, if altered, would have to be com-
pensated. This might be avoided, for example, by carefully stating 
that the shares are subject to modification based on legitimate 
management needs. 
A wide variety of other laws place various requirements and 
restrictions upon fishery management provisions, and these need 
to be considered in limited access as well. The principal laws 
reviewed in Chapter 7 include the Regulatory Flexibility Act, Ex-
ecutive Order 12291. the National Environmental Policy Act, the 
Coastal Zone Management Act, the Administrative Procedures Act, 
the Endangered Species Act, and the Marine Mammal Protection 
Act. The need to show compliance with these other applicable laws 
should not prove to be a barrier to implementing limited access 
systems. 
POSTSCRIPT ____________ _ 
While this study was underway, two national studies of fishery 
management have given greater prominence to the discussion of 
limiting access to fisheries. The American Fisheries Society's ad 
hoc Committee on Federal Fisheries Responsibilities, chaired by 
John Harville, recommended that " ... the American Fisheries 
Society should endorse the concept of controlled access for fisheries, 
to include use where appropriate of such management tools as license 
limitation, individual fishermen quotas, or other measures designed 
to avert the 'tragedy of the commons' " (Harville 1986, p. 4). The 
Comm.ittee also recommended authorization of userfees or royalties 
to recover costs of managing fisheries. 
The NOAA Fishery Management Study (U.S. Dep. Commer. 
1986), written by an eleven-member panel appointed by the Ad-
ministrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion and led by William 1. Hargis, Jr., recommended that licenses 
and fees be established for all fisheries under federal jurisdiction. 
The licenses would be issued by coastal states. The fees, collected 
by states but shared with the federal government, would help to 
improve fisheries, including research, data collection, enforcement, 
and habitat improvement. The NOAA study also states that "Limited 
entry, rights to the opportunity to fish through individual quota 
shares, lotteries or some other means must be implemented. " (Em-
phasis added.) During the discussion of these two reports, the present 
study of Pacific coast ground fish should provide a useful starting 
point for more detailed, practical discussion of modified fisheries 
management institutions. 
As noted in the Preface to this report, the Working Group on 
Limited Access Alternatives was assisted by a Groundfish Alter-
natives Management advisory group (GAM, for short) made up of 
industry and state fishery agency personnel. During the lengthy 
discussions between Working Group and GAM members, several 
important issues seemed to draw the most consistent attention. In 
this postscript I will highlight some of those considerations that occur 
to me of most general interest. Although there are no real surprises 
here, it may prove instructive to future developers of fishery 
regulations. 
First, many GAM members expressed support for the process 
which combined a working group to write this report with an ad-
visory group to review and comment on the report. The extended 
time from beginning to end of the study and the number of hours 
spent together by the two groups served to increase the value of 
this consultation. The industry people needed time and detailed 
review of fundamental concepts before they were prepared to 
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seriously consider altered management arrangements such as IFQs. 
It also took ample time for Working Group members to understand 
some of the industry concerns. Although it may seem trite, a degree 
of trust and openness in the discussion is necessary for learning 
to occur, and this develops as the participants become familiar with 
one another, learn many unfamiliar terms, and absorb the back-
ground information. Future limited access proposals for considera-
tion by management agencies will need to draw upon both the 
management specialists and the industry spokesmen who are capable 
of talking in each others' terms. 
Limited access is extremely malleable. It ranges from private 
property rights (e.g., simple ownership of land) to simple group 
membership rules for common property resources (e.g., most 
fishery license limitations). The flexibility it offers regarding 
transferability, scope, nature of rights and so forth, permits a limited 
access system to meet most objections that managers and fishermen 
express. Early in the consultations some GAM members had ex-
perience with only a particular license limitation program that, in 
their view, had serious defects. This limited experience proved to 
be an initial stumbling block in our discussions. After seeing the 
broader set of alternatives and reviewing worldwide experience with 
limited access, some fishermen who were initially adamantly op-
posed to any form of limited access became interested in discuss-
ing the merits of various options. The combination of flexibility 
in program design and thorough consultation with affected parties 
should contribute to successful implementation of limited access 
programs. 
While much of the academic and economic discussion focuses 
on the economic efficiency of fishery management under limited 
access, current participants tend to concern themselves with the 
resulting distribution of the wealth (commonly known as "alloca-
tion"). People with financial or other interests in the fishery fear 
that future incomes or fishing opportunities will be jeopardized, 
possibly due to unforeseen complications in the bureaucratic pro-
cess. Also, there are those who feel transferable license prices repre-
sent an undeserved windfall gain to original license holders. If, as 
Peter Pearse has suggested, equity is more important than efficiency 
in developing a license limitation system, a first priority should be 
to resolve this issue early by establishing what each user group is 
likely to sacrifice and what each is likely to gain. 
Another equity issue is that of market concentration. Consolida-
tion of licenses or IFQs in the hands of a few owners may provide 
a new avenue for economic control of the fishery. Fear that in-
dividual vessel operators may lose their independence to a kind of 
"company town" arrangement with larger fish companies is not 
uncommon. Another is that lending institutions and insurance com-
panies may use the individual, transferable license as a tool to con-
trol or collect payments from individual fishermen. These fears may 
be quelled by careful development of restrictions on the transfer 
and ownership of licenses and individual quotas. But any such 
restrictions must be viewed from both sides; they may prevent poten-
tial inequities, but they also limit the freedom of action for owners 
of permits. 
Another issue of substantial interest was the possibility of using 
limited access to reduce the wide swings in profitability and fleet 
size that have recently plagued the groundfish fishery. As one in-
dustry member complained, during the boom and bust of 1977-82, 
many good fishermen making apparently good business decisions 
were going broke through no fault of their own. As described in 
Chapter 2, this was partly due to swings in abundance of pink shrimp 
and rockfish and unfulfilled expectations regarding the developing 
Alaska ground fish fishery, as well as the standard financial dif-
ficulties associated with high mortgage interest and reduced fish 
prices. Although most agreed that vessel operators should risk 
bankruptcy as a result of bad decisions, the effects of economic 
competition would have been more productive if open access had 
not permitted so many new vessels to be built (with federal con-
struction subsidies) and so many trawl vessels to migrate to the 
Pacific coast during years of good pink shrimp fishing . By placing 
a more-or-Iess rigid ceiling on total level of participation, a limited 
entry system would stabilize the fishing fleet size, thus avoiding 
the highly visible periods of widespread bankruptcy in the fishery. 
Some industry members look at this stabilization as a legitimate 
function of government. 
Where do we go from here? The Working Group effort was not 
designed to recommend a program of limited access in the Pacific 
coast fishery, and this report reflects that fact. It is nevertheless 
useful to describe some promising approaches. A license moratorium 
such as the one originally developed by the Fishermen's Marketing 
Association and Coast Draggers Association could provide a tem-
porary limit on new entry while a more extended discussion of the 
eventual system proceeds. In fact, this was the intent of that pro-
posal. This approach worked in the California salmon troll fishery, 
where the industry became actively involved in developing a par-
tially transferable vessel license program after the fishermen's 
license moratorium was put into effect. It recently failed, however, 
when attempted by the North Pacific Fishery Management Coun-
cil in the Alaska halibut fishery. Strong opposition by key elements 
of the industry was the underlying reason for disapproval of the 
proposed halibut program. 
Other observers of license limitation programs warn that the first 
step often becomes the final step; a hastily designed, temporary 
measure can slide into permanency despite original intentions of 
the managers. This observation could lead one to recommend 
development of a comprehensive and permanent system at the outset. 
To do so would require extraordinary skill and prescience. On the 
other hand, worldwide experience of limited access programs (see 
Mollen 1986) suggests that most programs were repeatedly amended 
to deal with evolving problems and conditions. Also, the need for 
widespread participation in decision making makes it impossible 
to assemble a fuUy developed limited access program within 
management circles before opening the discussion to industry and 
public scrutiny. One way to avoid the horns of this dilemma would 
be to include in an initial, temporary program a requirement that 
a complete and comprehensive system be developed and im-
plemented by a fixed date. 
A test of the individual quota share approach would be feasible 
on a limited part of the fishery. Some of the industry spokesmen 
were quite leery of Individual Fishermen Quotas, both because they 
may be difficult to enforce and because they might cause an increase 
in discards of fish. Whether or not discards would be a major 
problem seems to depend upon two major factors: (1) whether a 
good market for quotas develops; and (2) whether the fish is 
normally caught in combination with others. On the assumption 
that it would be best to test the system in small steps, it would be 
logical to try IFQs for a species like widow rockfish, where 
incidental catch of other species is not a serious problem. This would 
require only minimal new enforcement effort, since trip limits, 
which necessitate monitoring of an individual vessel's landings per 
trip, are already in effect on widow rockfish. The major tasks would 
be to determine initial quotas, develop the enforcement procedures, 
and establish a market for quotas that allows fishermen to buy and 
sell harvest rights to meet their changing needs. A thorough test 
of this sort would generate invaluable information and would 
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undoubtedly reveal additional problems that are not currently 
anticipated . 
In sum, the consideration of limited access for commercial 
fisheries involves fishery management and industry participants all 
around the nation. Limited access covers a broad array of approaches 
that need to be specifically tailored to local circumstances, probably 
through intense involvement of industry and management agency 
personnel. The more common license limitation systems have 
achieved only very limited objectives to date, but the advantages 
of individual quotas are based more on theory than experience. 
Hence, some limited test cases may be a profitable way to begin 
learning more about the quota share systems. 
Finally, no matter what form of limited access is implemented, 
it will not normally deal with all the objectives of fishery manage-
ment. Overcapacity and overfishing can be controlled through 
limiting access. but user conflicts, size-at-capture, and other con-
siderations will continue to require attention through traditional 
forms of regulation. Limited access can be a very powerful force 
for efficiency and stability in commercial fisheries, but it is not a 
panacea. Research and development, possibly through adoption of 
test cases as suggested above, should continue so that we can apply 
this management tool appropriately and beneficially. 
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Appendix A 
Elenlents of Proposal 
for a Groundfish Trawl 
License Moratorium by 
the Fishermen's Marketing 
Association! and Coast 
Draggers Association2 
'320 Second St., Eureka, CA 95501. 
'P.O. Box 343, Aberdeen, WA 98520. 
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I. A trawl license moratorium would be established by legisla-
tion in the states of California, Oregon, and Washington which 
would create a groundfish trawl license and simultaneously place 
a moratorium upon their issuance. The legislation would become 
effective only when all three states have adopted similar legislation. 
2. A regional groundfish trawl license would be established with 
the license assigned to a particular vessel. This license would allow 
the vessel to operate in the waters adjacent to, and deliver ground-
fish to the states of, Washington, Oregon, and California. The 
license may be transfered with sale of the vessel. 
3. A tri-state industry governing Board should be established, 
composed of one person representing the directors of the three state 
fisheries departments and nine active trawl vessel owners. The direc-
tors' representative should act as chairman of the Board and vote 
only in case of a tie. The person selected to represent the directors 
should rotate annually amongst the three states. There should be 
three vessel owners selected by the Governor or Fisheries Direc-
tor of each state. The selection should be made from a list of names 
submitted by a trawl association or individuals at large. The vessel 
owners should serve three-year terms staggered on one-year 
intervals. 
A quorum for the Board should consist of five vessel owners with 
at least one vessel owner from each state present. Actions requiring 
the approval of a vote should pass with a simple majority of members 
present. 
4. Funding for the administration and costs of Board meetings 
should be covered by the levy of a flat fee of $100 per vessel. This 
fee should be collected when the vessel owner purchases his com-
mercial license. 
5. In order to receive a license, a vessel must meet an initial 
qualification of either delivering 100,000 pounds of groundfish or 
making at least 12 deliveries of groundfish during one year using 
legal trawl gear for groundfish as defined by the Pacific Coast 
Groundfish Management Plan. This qualification cannot be met by 
delivering incidentally caught ground fish from another fishery. 
6. In order to maintain a license, a vessel must continue to meet 
the initial qualification of 100,000 pounds or 12 deliveries on an 
annual basis. If a vessel owner knows beforehand that his boat will 
not be able to meet the continuing qualifications because of removal 
of the vessel from the ground fish fishery into another fishery, he 
may request an exemption from the governing Board in advance. 
7. Individuals with a contract signed during 1984 or who have 
begun new construction or conversion during 1984 shall qualify 
for a license. However, the governing Board must first verify the 
validity of such contracts for initiation of construction or conversion. 
8. The governing Board may grant licenses to anyone based upon 
prior involvement in the fishery, provided they have remained ac-
tive in the trawl fishery in the Northeast Pacific or Bering Sea and 
they appeal for the license during the first year of this moratorium. 
9. Unconditional replacement of vessels should be allowed. 
Replacement of vessels lost due to sinking or the desire to upgrade 
or downgrade should be allowed. If a person wishes to upgrade 
or downgrade with a second vessel, the original vessel must be 
removed from the fishery. 
10. The size and condition of the fleet should be reviewed an-
nUally. The size of the fleet will slowly decrease through attrition. 
An annual review should establish if the fleet is higher than, equal 
to, or below the optimum level in relationship to stock size and 
market demand. 

